Archive for the ‘Ukraine’ Category

Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin expected to discuss Ukraine sanctions in weekend phone call – The Independent

President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin are expected to discuss Ukraine sanctions when the two speak for the first time since the inauguration.

Mr Trump has criticised the Obama administration in the past for sanctions imposed in 2014 for Russia's illegal annexation of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula. He has indicated that he would lift the sanctions against Russia in exchangefor a nuclear arms reduction deal.

The President is also scheduled to speak with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the same day he speaks with the Russian president. The call is expected to focus on Russia.

Should Mr Trump decide to lift the 2014 sanctions, he will face opposition from leaders in Washington and abroad.

Sen John McCain, who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, condemned the possible move by the White Houseto lift sanctions as a "reckless course" and said he would work with Congress to "codify sanctions against Russia into law".

"Putin wants to be our enemy. He needs us as his enemy," Mr McCain said. "He believes that strengthening Russia means weakening America. "

"President Trump should remember this when he speaks with Vladimir Putin," he added. "He should remember that the man on the other end of the line is a murderer and a thug who seeks to undermine American national security interests at every turn.

"For our commander-in-chief to think otherwise would be nave and dangerous."

In his final White House press conference, former President Barack Obama said he believed the sanctions should remain connected to the reasons they were implemented in the first place. If Russia stopped "meddling" in Ukraine's affairs, then he would support a lift.

"The reason we oppose the recall was not because of nuclear issues. It was because the independence and sovereignty of a country, Ukraine, had been encroached upon by force by Russia, Mr Obama told reporters.

"I think it will probably best serve not only American interests but also the interests of preserving international norms," he added, "if we made sure that we dont confuse why these sanctions have been imposed with a whole set of other issues."

The Trump administration has faced scrutiny for its alleged links to Russia during the 2016 election campaign. Intelligence officials assessed that the Kremlin was behind hacks of the Democratic National Committee with the intent of swaying the electionin Mr Trump's favour.

A reversal of the sanctions also raises conflict-of-interest questions with regardto Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson.

While ExxonMobil CEO, Mr Tillerson brokered deals with the Russian oil conglomerate Rosneftestimated at $1bn (800m). But Exxon had to suspend operations in Russia as a result of the 2014 sanctions.

Theresa May in America: The PM's first speech in 90 seconds

Mr Tillerson has come under fire for providing misleading answers about his role in lobbying against the sanctions while running the massive oil company in 2015 and 2016.

"I have never lobbied against sanctions personally, Mr Tillerson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To my knowledge, Exxon never directly lobbied against sanctions."

However, between 2014 and 2015, according to public documents, Exxon spent some $300,000 on lobbying against the Russian sanctions in Washington.

But the budding relationship between the Trump administration and Mr Putin could lead to friction between the US and UK, complicating the "special relationship" between the two countries.

Speaking to congressional Republicans in Philadelphia this week, Theresa May issued a warning about the Russian President.

"When it comes to Russia, as so often it is wise to turn to the example of President Reagan who, during negotiations with his opposite number Mikhail Gorbachev, used to abide by the adage 'trust but verify'," she said.

"With President Putin, my advice is to 'engage but beware'."

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Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin expected to discuss Ukraine sanctions in weekend phone call - The Independent

Protesters Vow To Indefinitely Block Rail Lines To Eastern Ukraine – RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty

Ukrainian nationalists have vowed to indefinitely block a railway line into eastern Ukraine to protest against trade with Russia-backed separatists.

Volodymyr Parasyuk, a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, told Ukraina 112 TV on January 27 that "all the railways will be blocked" and "the action will last more than just one or two days -- it will be indefinite."

The blockade aims to stop both legal and illegal contraband trade with areas controlled by separatists and is being carried out by members of parliament and several dozen former volunteer fighters for the government.

The blockade has held up 12 freight trains with more than 700 coaches since it began on January 26, TASS reported.

Kyiv in 2015 banned almost all trade with separatist strongholds, prompting a boom in smuggling. The only commodity that can be obtained legally from the region is coal.

The pro-Kyiv governor of the Lugansk region, Yuriy Harbuz, warned that the blockade "threatens the energy security of the country," in the height of winter.

Harbuz said the protesters "had blocked empty train cars intended to transport coal into the territory controlled by Ukraine."

"If fuel supplies aren't restarted, heat and power stations in central and western Ukraine will be left without fuel," he warned.

Excerpt from:
Protesters Vow To Indefinitely Block Rail Lines To Eastern Ukraine - RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty

Holodomor – Wikipedia

The Holodomor (Ukrainian: ),[a] was a man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932 and 1933 that killed an estimated 2.57.5 million Ukrainians, with millions more counted in demographic estimates. It was part of the wider Soviet famine of 193233, which affected the major grain-producing areas of the country.

During the Holodomor millions of inhabitants of Ukraine, the majority of whom were ethnic Ukrainians, died of starvation in a peacetime catastrophe unprecedented in the history of Ukraine.[11] Since 2006, the Holodomor has been recognized by Ukraine[12] and 24 other countries as a genocide of the Ukrainian people carried out by the Soviet government.[13]

Early estimates of the death toll by scholars and government officials varied greatly; anywhere from 1.8 to 12 million ethnic Ukrainians were said to have perished as a result of the famine. Recent research has since narrowed the estimates to between 2.4[16] and 7.5[17] million. The exact number of deaths is hard to determine, due to a lack of records,[18][19] but the number increases significantly when the deaths inside heavily Ukrainian-populated Kuban are included. Older estimates are still often cited in political commentary.[21] According to the findings of the Court of Appeal of Kiev in 2010, the demographic losses due to the famine amounted to 10 million, with 3.9 million direct famine deaths, and a further 6.1 million birth deficit.[18]

Some scholars believe that the famine was planned by Joseph Stalin to eliminate a Ukrainian independence movement.[11][22] Using Holodomor in reference to the famine emphasizes its man-made aspects, arguing that actions such as rejection of outside aid, confiscation of all household foodstuffs, and restriction of population movement confer intent, defining the famine as genocide; the loss of life has been compared to the Holocaust.[24][25][26][27] If Soviet policies and actions were conclusively documented as intending to eradicate the rise of Ukrainian nationalism, they would fall under the legal definition of genocide.[28][29][30][32]

The word Holodomor literally translated from Ukrainian means "death by hunger", or "to kill by hunger, to starve to death". Sometimes the expression is translated into English as "murder by hunger or starvation".[34] Holodomor is a compound of the Ukrainian words holod meaning "hunger" and mor meaning "plague". The expression moryty holodom means "to inflict death by hunger". The Ukrainian verb moryty () means "to poison somebody, drive to exhaustion or to torment somebody". The perfective form of the verb moryty is zamoryty "kill or drive to death by hunger, exhausting work". The word was used in print as early as 1978 by Ukrainian immigrant organisations in the United States and Canada. However, in the Soviet Union of which Ukraine was a constituent republic references to the famine were controlled, even after de-Stalinization in 1956. Historians could speak only of 'food difficulties', and the use of the very word golod/holod (hunger, famine) was forbidden.

Discussion of the Holodomor became more open as part of Glasnost in the late 1980s. In Ukraine, the first official use of the word was a December 1987 speech by Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine,[38] on the occasion of the republic's seventieth anniversary.[39] An early public usage in the Soviet Union was in February 1988, in a speech by Oleksiy Musiyenko, Deputy Secretary for ideological matters of the party organisation of the Kiev branch of the Union of Soviet Writers in Ukraine.[40][41] The term may have first appeared in print in the Soviet Union on 18 July 1988, in his article on the topic. "Holodomor" is now an entry in the modern, two-volume dictionary of the Ukrainian language, published in 2004. The term is described as "artificial hunger, organised on a vast scale by a criminal regime against a country's population."[43]

The famine had been predicted as far back as 1930 by academics and advisers to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic government, but little to no preventive action was taken.[44] The famine affected the Ukrainian SSR as well as the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (a part of the Ukrainian SSR at the time) in the spring of 1932[45] and from February to July 1933, with the greatest number of victims recorded in the spring of 1933. Between 1926 and 1939, the Ukrainian population increased by 6.6%, whereas Russia and Belarus grew by 16.9% and 11.7%, respectively.[47][48]

From the 1932 harvest, Soviet authorities were able to procure only 4.3 million tons as compared with 7.2 million tons obtained from the 1931 harvest. Rations in town were drastically cut back, and in the winter of 193233 and spring of 1933 people in many urban areas were starved. The urban workers were supplied by a rationing system (and therefore could occasionally assist their starving relatives of the countryside), but rations were gradually cut; and by the spring of 1933, the urban residents also faced starvation. At the same time, workers were shown agitprop movies, where all peasants were portrayed as counterrevolutionaries hiding grain and potatoes at a time when workers, who were constructing the "bright future" of socialism, were starving.[51]

The first reports of mass malnutrition and deaths from starvation emerged from two urban areas of the city of Uman, reported in January 1933 by Vinnytsia and Kiev oblasts. By mid-January 1933, there were reports about mass "difficulties" with food in urban areas, which had been undersupplied through the rationing system, and deaths from starvation among people who were withdrawn from the rationing supply. The withdrawal was to comply with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Decree of December 1932. By the beginning of February 1933, according to reports from local authorities and Ukrainian GPU, the most affected area was Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, which also suffered from epidemics of typhus and malaria. Odessa and Kiev oblasts were second and third, respectively. By mid-March, most of the reports of starvation originated from Kiev Oblast.

By mid-April 1933, Kharkiv Oblast reached the top of the most affected list, while Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Vinnytsia, and Donetsk oblasts, and Moldavian SSR were next on the list. Reports about mass deaths from starvation, dated mid-May through the beginning of June 1933, originated from raions in Kiev and Kharkiv oblasts. The "less affected" list noted Chernihiv Oblast and northern parts of Kiev and Vinnytsia oblasts. The Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine Decree of 8 February 1933 said no hunger cases should have remained untreated. Local authorities had to submit reports about the numbers suffering from hunger, the reasons for hunger, number of deaths from hunger, food aid provided from local sources, and centrally provided food aid required. The GPU managed parallel reporting and food assistance in the Ukrainian SSR. (Many regional reports and most of the central summary reports are available from present-day central and regional Ukrainian archives.)[52]The Ukrainian Weekly, which was tracking the situation in 1933, reported the difficulties in communications and the appalling situation in Ukraine.

Evidence of widespread cannibalism was documented during the Holodomor.[27][53]

Survival was a moral as well as a physical struggle. A woman doctor wrote to a friend in June 1933 that she had not yet become a cannibal, but was "not sure that I shall not be one by the time my letter reaches you." The good people died first. Those who refused to steal or to prostitute themselves died. Those who gave food to others died. Those who refused to eat corpses died. Those who refused to kill their fellow man died. Parents who resisted cannibalism died before their children did.[54]

The Soviet regime printed posters declaring: "To eat your own children is a barbarian act.":225 More than 2,500 people were convicted of cannibalism during the Holodomor.[56]

The reasons for the famine are a subject of scholarly and political debate. Some scholars suggest that the man-made famine was a consequence of the economic problems associated with changes implemented during the period of Soviet industrialisation.[30][34][57]

Collectivisation also contributed to famine in 1932. Collectivization in the Soviet Union, including the Ukrainian SSR, was not popular among the peasantry; and forced collectivisation led to numerous peasant revolts. The first five-year plan changed the output expected from Ukrainian farms, from the familiar crop of grain to unfamiliar crops like sugar beets and cotton. In addition, the situation was exacerbated by poor administration of the plan and the lack of relevant general management. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested, and even when harvested a significant percentage was lost during processing, transportation, or storage.[citation needed]

However, it has also been proposed that the Soviet leadership used the man-made famine to attack Ukrainian nationalism, and thus the man-made famine may fall under the legal definition of genocide.[28][29][30][27][32] For example, special and particularly lethal policies were adopted in and largely limited to Soviet Ukraine at the end of 1932 and 1933. According to Snyder: "[E]ach of them may seem like an anodyne administrative measure, and each of them was certainly presented as such at the time, and yet each had to kill."[59]

By the end of 1933, millions of people had starved to death or had otherwise died unnaturally in Ukraine and the other Soviet republics. The total number of population losses (famine death and birth deficit) across the entire Soviet Union is estimated as 67 million.[60] The Soviet Union long denied that the famine had taken place. The NKVD (and later KGB) archives on the Holodomor period made records available very slowly. The exact number of the victims remains unknown and is probably impossible to estimate, even within a margin of error of a hundred thousand.[61] The media have reported estimates by historians of fatalities as high as seven to ten million.[62][63][64][65] Former Ukrainian president Yushchenko stated in a speech to the United States Congress that the Holodomor "took away 20 million lives of Ukrainians",[66] while former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued a public statement giving the death toll at about 10 million.[21][67] The use of this figure has been criticised by historians Timothy D. Snyder and Stephen G. Wheatcroft. Snyder wrote: "President Viktor Yushchenko does his country a grave disservice by claiming ten million deaths, thus exaggerating the number of Ukrainians killed by a factor of three; but it is true that the famine in Ukraine of 19321933 was a result of purposeful political decisions, and killed about three million people."[67] In an email to Postmedia News, Wheatcroft wrote: "I find it regrettable that Stephen Harper and other leading Western politicians are continuing to use such exaggerated figures for Ukrainian famine mortality" and "There is absolutely no basis for accepting a figure of 10 million Ukrainians dying as a result of the famine of 193233."[21]

Estimates vary in their coverage, with some using the 1933 Ukraine borders, some the current borders, and some counting ethnic Ukrainians. Some extrapolate on the basis of deaths in a given area, while others use archival data. Some historians question the accuracy of Soviet censuses, as they may reflect Soviet propaganda. Other estimates come from recorded discussions between world leaders like Churchill and Stalin. In an August 1942 conversation, Stalin gave Churchill his estimates of the number of "kulaks" who were repressed for resisting collectivisation as 10 million, in all of the Soviet Union, rather than only in Ukraine. When using this number, Stalin implied that it included not only those who lost their lives, but also those who were forcibly deported.[69][70] Additionally there are variations in opinion as to whether deaths in Gulag labour camps should be counted, or only those who starved to death at home. The estimate prior to the opening of the former Soviet archives varied widely but the range was narrower: for example, 2.5 million (Volodymyr Kubiyovych),[70] 4.8 million (Vasyl Hryshko)[70] and 5 million (Robert Conquest).

One modern calculation that uses demographic data, including those recently available from Soviet archives, narrows the losses to about 3.2 million or, allowing for the lack of precise data, 3 million to 3.5 million.[70][72][73] Soviet archives show that excess deaths in Ukraine in 19321933 numbered a minimum of 1.8 million (2.7 including birth losses). This source further states "Depending upon the estimations made concerning unregistered mortality and natality, these figures could be increased to a level of 2.8 million to a maximum of 4.8 million excess deaths and to 3.7 million to a maximum of 6.7 million population losses (including birth losses)". In 19321933, there were 1.2 million cases of typhus and 500,000 cases of typhoid fever. Malnourishment increases fatality rates from many diseases, and are not counted by some historians. From 1932 to 1934, the largest rate of increase was recorded for typhus, commonly spread by lice. In conditions of harvest failure and increased poverty, lice are likely to increase. Gathering numerous refugees at railway stations, on trains and elsewhere facilitates the spread. In 1933, the number of recorded cases was 20 times the 1929 level. The number of cases per head of population recorded in Ukraine in 1933 was already considerably higher than in the USSR as a whole. By June 1933, incidence in Ukraine had increased to nearly 10 times the January level, and it was much higher than in the rest of the USSR. The number of recorded excess deaths extracted from the birth/death statistics from Soviet archives is contradictory. The data fail to add up to the differences between the results of the 1926 Census and the 1937 Census.[70]

Kulchytsky summarised the natural population change.[70] The declassified Soviet statistics show a decrease of 538,000 people in the population of Soviet Ukraine between 1926 census (28,925,976) and 1937 census (28,388,000). The number of births and deaths (in thousands) according to the declassified records are given in the table (right).

According to the correction for officially non-accounted child mortality in 1933[76] by 150,000 calculated by Sergei Maksudov, the number of births for 1933 should be increased from 471,000 to 621,000 (down from 1,184,000 in 1927). Given the decreasing birth rates and assuming the natural mortality rates in 1933 to be equal to the average annual mortality rate in 19271930 (524,000 per year), a natural population growth for 1933 would have been 97,000 (as opposed to the recorded decrease of 1,379,000). This was five times less than the growth in the previous three years (19271930). The natural population growth from 1927 to 1936 should have been 4.043 million, while the census data showed a decrease of 538,000. The sum of the two numbers gives an estimated total demographic loss of 4.581 million people.

Estimates of the human losses due to famine must account for the numbers involved in migration (including forced resettlement). According to Soviet statistics, the migration balance for the population in Ukraine for 19271936 period was a loss of 1.343 million people. Even when the data were collected, the Soviet statistical institutions acknowledged that the precision was less than for the data of the natural population change. The total number of deaths in Ukraine due to unnatural causes for the given ten years was 3.238 million; accounting for the lack of precision, estimates of the human toll range from 2.2 million to 3.5 million deaths.

A 2002 study by Vallin et al.[78][79] utilising some similar primary sources to Kulchytsky, and performing an analysis with more sophisticated demographic tools with forward projection of expected growth from the 1926 census and backward projection from the 1939 census estimates the amount of direct deaths for 1933 as 2.582 million. This number of deaths does not reflect the total demographic loss for Ukraine from these events as the fall of the birth rate during crisis and the out-migration contribute to the latter as well. The total population shortfall from the expected value between 1926 and 1939 estimated by Vallin amounted to 4.566 million. Of this number, 1.057 million is attributed to birth deficit, 930,000 to forced out-migration, and 2.582 million to the combination of excess mortality and voluntary out-migration. With the latter assumed to be negligible this estimate gives the number of deaths as the result of the 1933 famine about 2.2 million. According to this study the life expectancy for those born in 1933 sharply fell to 10.8 years for females and to 7.3 years for males and remained abnormally low for 1934 but, as commonly expected for the post-crisis peaked in 193536.

According to historian Snyder, the recorded figure of excess deaths was 2.4 million. However, Snyder claims that this figure is "substantially low" due to many deaths going unrecorded. Snyder states that demographic calculations carried out by the Ukrainian government provide a figure of 3.89 million dead, and opined that the actual figure is likely between these two figures, approximately 3.3 million deaths to starvation and disease related to the starvation in Ukraine from 1932 to 1933. Snyder also estimates that of the million people who died in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic from famine at the same time, approximately 200,000 were ethnic Ukrainians due to Ukrainian-inhabited regions being particularly hard hit in Russia. As a child, Mikhail Gorbachev, born into a mixed Russian-Ukrainian family, experienced the famine in Stavropol, Russia. He recalled in a memoir that "In that terrible year [in 1933] nearly half the population of my native village, Privolnoye, starved to death, including two sisters and one brother of my father."[80]

According to one estimate[76] about 81.3% of the famine victims in the Ukrainian SSR were ethnic Ukrainians, 4.5% Russians, 1.4% Jews and 1.1% were Poles. Many Belarusians, Hungarians, Volga Germans and other nationalities became victims as well. The Ukrainian rural population was the hardest hit by the Holodomor. Since the peasantry constituted a demographic backbone of the Ukrainian nation, the tragedy deeply affected the Ukrainians for many years. In an October 2013 opinion poll (in Ukraine) 38.7% of those polled stated "my families had people affected by the famine", 39.2% stated they did not have such relatives, and 22.1% did not know.[82]

In response to the demographic collapse, the Soviet authorities ordered large-scale resettlements, with over 117,000 of peasants from remote regions of Soviet Union taking over the deserted farms.[83]

Robert Conquest, the author of the Harvest of Sorrow, has stated that the famine of 193233 was a deliberate act of mass murder, if not genocide committed as part of Joseph Stalin's collectivisation program in the Soviet Union. Conquest, R.W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft believe that, had industrialisation been abandoned, the famine would have been "prevented" (Conquest), or at least significantly alleviated:

[W]e regard the policy of rapid industrialisation as an underlying cause of the agricultural troubles of the early 1930s, and we do not believe that the Chinese or NEP versions of industrialisation were viable in Soviet national and international circumstances.:626

They see the leadership under Stalin as making significant errors in planning for the industrialisation of agriculture. Dr. Michael Ellman of the University of Amsterdam argues that, in addition to deportations, internment in the Gulag camps and shootings (See: Law of Spikelets), there is evidence that Stalin used starvation as a weapon in his war against the peasantry. He analyses the actions of the Soviet authorities, two of commission and one of omission: (i) exporting 1.8 million tonnes of grain during the mass starvation (enough to feed more than five million people for one year), (ii) preventing migration from famine afflicted areas (which may have cost an estimated 150,000 lives) and (iii) making no effort to secure grain assistance from abroad (which caused an estimated 1.5 million excess deaths), as well as the attitude of the Stalinist regime in 193233 that many of those starving to death were "counter-revolutionaries", "idlers" or "thieves" who fully deserved their fate. Based on this analysis he concludes, however, that the actions of Stalin's authorities against Ukrainians do not meet the standards of specific intent required to prove genocide as defined by the UN convention (with the notable exception of the case of Kuban Ukrainians). Ellman further concluded that if the relaxed definition of genocide is used, the actions of Stalin's authorities do fit such a definition of genocide. However, this more relaxed definition of genocide makes the latter a common historical event,[clarification needed] according to Ellman. Regarding the aforementioned actions taken by Stalin in the early 1930s, Ellman unambiguously states that, from the standpoint of contemporary international criminal law, Stalin is "clearly guilty" of "a series of crimes against humanity" and that, from the standpoint of national criminal law, the only way to defend Stalin from a charge of mass murder is "to argue he was ignorant of the consequences of his actions". He also rebukes Davies and Wheatcroft for, among other things, their "very narrow understanding" of intent. He states:

According to them, only taking an action whose sole objective is to cause deaths among the peasantry counts as intent. Taking an action with some other goal (e.g. exporting grain to import machinery) but which the actor certainly knows will also cause peasants to starve does not count as intentionally starving the peasants. However, this is an interpretation of 'intent' which flies in the face of the general legal interpretation.

Genocide scholar Adam Jones stresses that many of the actions of the Soviet leadership during 193132 should be considered genocidal. Not only did the famine kill millions, it took place against "a backdrop of persecution, mass execution, and incarceration clearly aimed at undermining Ukrainians as a national group".Norman Naimark, a historian at Stanford University who specialises in many fields of modern European history,[89] genocide and ethnic cleansing, argues that some of the actions of Stalin's regime, not only those during the Holodomor but also Dekulakization and targeted campaigns (with over 110,000 shot)[citation needed][27] against particular ethnic groups, can be looked at as genocidal. In 2006, the Security Service of Ukraine declassified more than 5,000 pages of Holodomor archives.[91] These documents suggest that the Soviet regime singled out Ukraine by not giving it the same humanitarian aid given to regions outside it.[92]

The statistical distribution of famine's victims among the ethnicities closely reflects the ethnic distribution of the rural population of Ukraine[93] Moldavian, Polish, German and Bulgarian population that mostly resided in the rural communities of Ukraine suffered in the same proportion as the rural Ukrainian population.[93]

Author James Mace was one of the first to show that the famine constituted genocide, although Rapahel Lemkin, who coined the term, also described this famine as an act of Soviet genocide directed against the Ukrainian nation But British economist Stephen. Wheatcroft, who studied the famine, believed that Mace's work debased the field of Russian studies. However, Wheatcroft's characterisation of the famine deaths as largely excusable, negligent homicide has been challenged by economist Steven Rosefielde, who states:

Grain supplies were sufficient to sustain everyone if properly distributed. People died mostly of terror-starvation (excess grain exports, seizure of edibles from the starving, state refusal to provide emergency relief, bans on outmigration, and forced deportation to food-deficit locales), not poor harvests and routine administrative bungling.

Timothy D. Snyder, Professor of History at Yale University, asserts that in 1933 "Joseph Stalin was deliberately starving Ukraine" through a "heartless campaign of requisitions that began Europe's era of mass killing". He argues the Soviets themselves "made sure that the term genocide, contrary to Lemkin's intentions, excluded political and economic groups". Thus the Ukrainian famine can be presented as "somehow less genocidal because it targeted a class, kulaks, as well as a nation, Ukraine".

In his 1953 speech the "father of the [UN] Genocide Convention", Dr Raphael Lemkin described "the destruction of the Ukrainian nation" as the "classic example of genocide", for "the Ukrainian is not and never has been a Russian. His culture, his temperament, his language, his religion, are all different... to eliminate (Ukrainian) nationalism...the Ukrainian peasantry was sacrificed... a famine was necessary for the Soviet and so they got one to order... if the Soviet program succeeds completely, if the intelligentsia, the priest, and the peasant can be eliminated [then] Ukraine will be as dead as if every Ukrainian were killed, for it will have lost that part of it which has kept and developed its culture, its beliefs, its common ideas, which have guided it and given it a soul, which, in short, made it a nation... This is not simply a case of mass murder. It is a case of genocide, of the destruction, not of individuals only, but of a culture and a nation."[99]:5556

[T]he evidence of a large-scale famine was so overwhelming, was so unanimously confirmed by the peasants that the most "hard-boiled" local officials could say nothing in denial.

Chamberlin was a Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor for 10 years. In 1934, he was reassigned to the Far East. After he left the Soviet Union he wrote his account of the situation in Ukraine and North Caucasus (Poltava, Bila Tserkva, and Kropotkin). Chamberlin later published a couple of books: Russia's Iron Age and The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation.[102][103]

Holodomor denial is the assertion that the 19321933 genocide in Soviet Ukraine either did not occur or did occur but was not a premeditated act. Denying the existence of the famine was the Soviet state's position and reflected in both Soviet propaganda and the work of some Western journalists and intellectuals including George Bernard Shaw, Walter Duranty and Louis Fischer.[107][109] In the Soviet Union, authorities all but banned discussion of the famine, and Ukrainian historian Stanislav Kulchytsky stated the Soviet government ordered him to falsify his findings and depict the famine as an unavoidable natural disaster, to absolve the Communist Party and uphold the legacy of Stalin.[110]

The famine is officially considered by the modern Ukrainian government to be an act of genocide. United States and Europe do not recognize it as such, but consider that the Holodomor was an attack on the Ukrainian people.

In 2007, President Viktor Yushchenko declared he wants "a new law criminalising Holodomor denial", while Communist Party head Petro Symonenko said he "does not believe there was any deliberate starvation at all", and accused Yushchenko of "using the famine to stir up hatred".[63] Few in Ukraine share Symonenko's interpretation of history and the number of Ukrainians who deny the famine or view it as caused by natural reasons is steadily falling.[113]

On 10 November 2003 at the United Nations, 25 countries including Russia, Ukraine and United States signed a joint statement on the seventieth anniversary of the Holodomor with the following preamble:

In the former Soviet Union millions of men, women and children fell victims to the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime. The Great Famine of 19321933 in Ukraine (Holodomor), took from 7 million to 10 million innocent lives and became a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people. In this regard we note activities in observance of the seventieth anniversary of this Famine, in particular organized by the Government of Ukraine.

Nationwide, the political repression of 1937 (The Great Purge), under the guidance of Nikolai Yezhov, was known for its ferocity and ruthlessness, but Lev Kopelev wrote, "In Ukraine 1937 began in 1933", referring to the comparatively early beginning of the Soviet crackdown in Ukraine.

While the famine was well documented at the time by journalist Gareth Jones, its reality has been disputed for ideological reasons.

An example of a late-era Holodomor objector is Canadian trade union activist and journalist Douglas Tottle, author of Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (published by Moscow-based Communist publisher Progress Publishers in 1987). Tottle claims that while there were severe economic hardships in Ukraine, the idea of the Holodomor was fabricated as propaganda by Nazi Germany and William Randolph Hearst to justify a German invasion.

On 26 April 2010, newly elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych told Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe members that Holodomor was a common tragedy that struck Ukrainians and other Soviet peoples, and that it would be wrong to recognise the Holodomor as an act of genocide against one nation. He stated that "The Holodomor was in Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. It was the result of Stalin's totalitarian regime. But it would be wrong and unfair to recognize the Holodomor as an act of genocide against one nation."[117] He has, however, referred to it as a crime, a tragedy, and an Armageddon, while maintaining use of the word "Holodomor" to describe the event.[118] In response to Yanukovych's statements, the Our Ukraine Party alleged that Yanukovych directly violated Ukrainian law which defines the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian people and makes public denial of the Holodomor unlawful. Our Ukraine Party also asserted that Yanukovych "ignored a ruling of 13 January 2010 by Kiev's Court of Appeal, which recognized the leaders of the totalitarian Bolshevik regime as those guilty of 'genocide against the Ukrainian national group in 193233 through the artificial creation of living conditions intended for its partial physical destruction.'"[119] In 2012, Yanukovych referred to the Holodomor as a crime which caused fear and obedience.[118]

On 23 October 2008, the European Parliament adopted a resolution[120] that recognised the Holodomor as a crime against humanity.[121] On 27 April 2010, a draft Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution declared the famine was caused by the "cruel and deliberate actions and policies of the Soviet regime" and was responsible for the deaths of "millions of innocent people" in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Russia.[122] Even though PACE found Stalin guilty of causing the famine, it rejected several amendments to the resolution, which proposed the Holodomor be recognized as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.[123]

On 28 November 2006, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) passed a law defining the Holodomor as a deliberate act of genocide and made public denial illegal. Even though in April 2010 newly elected president Yanukovych reversed Yushchenko's position on the Holodomor famine,[122] the law has not been repealed and remains in force.[119] On 12 January 2010, the court of appeals in Kiev opened hearings into the "fact of genocide-famine Holodomor in Ukraine in 193233". In May 2009, the Security Service of Ukraine started a criminal case "in relation to the genocide in Ukraine in 193233".[126] In a ruling on 13 January 2010, the court found Joseph Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders guilty of genocide against the Ukrainians. The court dropped criminal proceedings against the leaders: Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, Stanislav Kosior, Pavel Postyshev, Vlas Chubar and others, who all had died years before.[127] This decision became effective on 21 January 2010.[128]

The joint statement at the United Nations in 2003 has defined the famine as the result of actions and policies of the totalitarian regime that caused the deaths of millions of Ukrainians, Russians, Kazakhs and other nationalities in the USSR.[114]

As of March 2008, more than 10 countries[129] have officially recognised the actions of the Soviet government as an act of genocide.

To honour those who perished in the Holodomor, monuments have been dedicated and public events held annually in Ukraine and worldwide.

Since 2006, Ukraine officially marks a Holodomor memorial day on the fourth Saturday of November.[82][130]

In 2006, the Holodomor Remembrance Day took place on 25 November. Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko directed, in decree No. 868/2006, that a minute of silence should be observed at 4 o'clock in the afternoon on that Saturday. The document specified that flags in Ukraine should fly at half-staff as a sign of mourning. In addition, the decree directed that entertainment events are to be restricted and television and radio programming adjusted accordingly.[131]

In 2007, the 74th anniversary of the Holodomor was commemorated in Kiev for three days on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti. As part of the three-day event, from 23 to 25 November, video testimonies of the communist regime's crimes in Ukraine, and documentaries by famous domestic and foreign film directors were shown. In addition, experts and scholars gave lectures on the topic.[132] As well, on 23 November 2007, the National Bank of Ukraine issued a set of two commemorative coins remembering the Holodomor.[133]

As of 2009, Ukrainian schoolchildren take a more extensive course of the history of the Holodomor, plus fighters in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army.[134]

The National Museum "Memorial to Holodomor victims" was erected on the slopes of the Dnieper river in 2008, welcoming its first visitors on 22 November 2008.[135] The ceremony of the memorial's opening was dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor.

In an October 2013 opinion poll, 33.7% of Ukrainians fully agreed and 30.4% rather agreed with the statement "The Holodomor was the result of actions committed by the Soviet authorities, along with Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, and was the result of human actions".[82] In the same poll, 22.9% of those polled fully or partially agreed with the view that the famine was caused by natural circumstances, but 50.5% disagreed with that.[82] Furthermore, 45.4% of respondents believed that the Holodomor was "a deliberate attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation" and 26.2% rather or completely disagreed with this.[82]

The first public monument to the Holodomor was erected and dedicated in 1983 outside City Hall in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, to mark the 50th anniversary of the famine-genocide. Since then, the fourth Saturday in November has in many jurisdictions been marked as the official day of remembrance for people who died as a result of the 193233 Holodomor and political repression.[136]

On 22 November 2008, Ukrainian Canadians marked the beginning of National Holodomor Awareness Week. Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Minister Jason Kenney attended a vigil in Kiev.[137] In November 2010, Prime Minister Stephen Harper visited the Holodomor memorial in Kiev, although Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych did not join him.

Saskatchewan became the first jurisdiction in North America and the first province in Canada to recognize the Holodomor as a genocide.[138] The Ukrainian Famine and Genocide (Holodomor) Memorial Day Act was introduced in the Saskatchewan Legislature on May 6, 2008[139] and received royal assent on May 14, 2008.[140]

On 9 April 2009, the Province of Ontario unanimously passed bill 147, "The Holodomor Memorial Day Act", which calls for the fourth Saturday in November to be a day of remembrance. This was the first piece of legislation in the Province's history to be introduced with Tri-Partisan sponsorship: the joint initiators of the bill were Dave Levac, MPP for Brant (Liberal Party); Cheri DiNovo, MPP for ParkdaleHigh Park (NDP); and Frank Klees, MPP for NewmarketAurora (PC). MPP Levac was made a chevalier of Ukraine's Order of Merit.[141]

On 2 June 2010, the Province of Quebec unanimously passed bill 390, "Memorial Day Act on the great Ukrainian famine and genocide (the Holodomor)".[142]

On 25 September 2010, a new Holodomor monument was unveiled at St. Mary's Ukrainian Catholic Church, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, bearing the inscription "Holodomor: Genocide By Famine in Ukraine 19321933" and a section in Ukrainian bearing mention of the 10 million victims.[143]

On September 21, 2014, a statue entitled "Bitter Memories of Childhood" was unveiled outside the Manitoba Legislature Building in Winnipeg.[144]

A monument to the Holodomor has been erected on Calgary's Memorial Drive, itself originally designated to honour Canadian servicemen of the First World War. The monument is located in the district of Renfrew near Ukrainian Pioneer Park, which pays tribute to the contributions of Ukrainian immigrants to Canada.

The Ukrainian Weekly reported a meeting taking place on 27 February 1982 in the parish center of the Ukrainian Catholic National Shrine of the Holy Family in commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Great Famine caused by the Soviet authorities. On 20 March 1982, the Ukrainian Weekly also reported a multi-ethnic community meeting that was held on 15 February on the North Shore Drive at the Ukrainian Village in Chicago to commemorate the famine which took the lives of seven million Ukrainians. Other events in commemoration were held in other places around the United States as well.[citation needed]

On 29 May 2008, the city of Baltimore held a candlelight commemoration for the Holodomor at the War Memorial Plaza in front of City Hall. This ceremony was part of the larger international journey of the "International Holodomor Remembrance Torch", which began in Kiev and made its way though thirty-three countries. Twenty-two other US cities were also visited during the tour. Then-Mayor Sheila Dixon presided over the ceremony and declared 29 May to be "Ukrainian Genocide Remembrance Day in Baltimore". She referred to the Holodomor "among the worst cases of man's inhumanity towards man".[145]

On 2 December 2008, a ceremony was held in Washington, D.C., for the Holodomor Memorial.[146] On 13 November 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama released a statement on Ukrainian Holodomor Remembrance Day. In this he said that "remembering the victims of the man-made catastrophe of Holodomor provides us an opportunity to reflect upon the plight of all those who have suffered the consequences of extremism and tyranny around the world".[147][148] NSC Spokesman Mike Hammer released a similar statement on 20 November 2010.[149]

In 2011, the U.S. day of remembrance of Holodomor was held on 19 November. The statement released by the White House Press Secretary reflects on the significance of this date, stating: "...in the wake of this brutal and deliberate attempt to break the will of the people of Ukraine, Ukrainians showed great courage and resilience. The establishment of a proud and independent Ukraine twenty years ago shows the remarkable depth of the Ukrainian people's love of freedom and independence."[150]

On 7 November 2015, the Holodomor Genocide Memorial was opened in Washington D.C., District of Columbia, USA.[151][152]

A monument has been erected in the city of Lublin.[153]

"Light the candle" event at a Holodomor memorial in Kiev

Monument in Kiev, called "The Bitter Memory of Childhood"

Monument to victims of Holodomor in Luhansk, Ukraine

Monument to victims of Holodomor in Novoaydar, Luhansk Oblast, Ukraine

Roman Kowal's Holodomor Memorial in Winnipeg, Canada

1983 Holodomor Monument in Edmonton, Canada (first in the world)

Holodomor Monument in Calgary, Canada

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Holodomor - Wikipedia

Ukraine: Reflections on the Maidan Revolution, a Voyage to Odessa, Donald Trump, Trans-Atlantic Disarray and … – Huffington Post

Aghast at the rise of Donald Trump and the slow disintegration of the European Union, many Ukrainians may certainly wonder about the legacy of Maidan. Foremost in the minds of many revolutionaries who sought to topple the unpopular government of Viktor Yanukovych was the overarching need to bring Ukraine into line with supposedly western standards of modernity. Yet, if anything, recent developments have served to underscore that the West is hardly a paragon of modern, pluralistic and tolerant values. Indeed, as Ukrainians seek to make due on the promise of Maidan, they may ask themselves whether the West is worthy of political or social emulation at all.

Such ironies were on vivid display recently, when I conducted my second research trip to Ukraine. The country is in the midst of Maidan's third anniversary and during a ceremony in Kyiv, government officials, protest veterans and others placed flowers at a monument to the "Heavenly Hundred" martyrs who had been killed in clashes with the Yanukovych government. The celebration was marred by the ongoing escalating war in the east where Russian-backed separatists hold sway. Indeed, at one point demonstrators even ransacked a branch of a Russian bank. Hoping to soothe the nation and mollify fraying tempers, President Petro Poroshenko assured Ukrainians that Kyiv would never return to its Moscow-dominated past and was moving toward European modernity.

For a more upbeat mood on Ukraine's revolutionary legacy, I head to Bar Baraban, a caf located just a few scant blocks from Maidan square. There, I speak with owner Gennady Kanishthemko, who harbored and protected students at his bar during the revolt against Yanukovych. Fleeing police brutality, students spent the night at his caf at the very beginning of Maidan protest. Sipping tea at a table inside the bar, Kanishthemko remarks that he always wanted Ukraine to become "part of the civilized world" so as to guarantee a legitimate state of law and western freedoms. "Hopefully," he adds, "outside pressure from the U.S. or E.U." can help to eliminate corruption in Ukraine. Ultimately, Kanishthemko adds, Ukraine must become part of the European Union which in turn may help to protect his country from Russia.

There are indications that Kanishthemko's optimism is somewhat warranted. Indeed, Maidan has spurred on the growth of civil society, including non-governmental organizations or N.G.O.'s. Meanwhile, the country has taken greater steps to ensure political and economic transparency. In line with reforms, officials must now reveal the true extent of their assets and property. Kyiv has also undertaken measures to ensure greater transparency in media, and not surprisingly reforms have revealed that media ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few fabulously wealthy oligarchs. Meanwhile, authorities are conducting police, judicial and tax reform.

Though the rise of Donald Trump has certainly scrambled expectations, one of the West's key strengths is thought to be modern views on women's rights. Just how has Maidan improved matters for gender equality? "Here in the bar," notes Kanishthemko, "everything is respectful, but if you go out into the towns it's more traditional and you get 'rednecks.' Despite rural conditions, Kanishthemko adds that women's rights have steadily improved in Ukraine. Across town, former Maidan activist Nataliya Neshevets agrees. A coordinator at Kyiv's Visual Culture Research Center or VCRC, young Neshevets remarks that feminism used to be pretty non-existent in Ukraine. To be sure, there were some small groups and perhaps a few dozen activists here or there but hardly what one might call a mainstream movement. On the Maidan, feminists were physically attacked "not so much by far right groups but by older people who were simply passing by, say men and women over the age of fifty." On the third year anniversary of Maidan, however, "feminism is growing and maybe there's more awareness about these issues now. The media is raising the issue of women. Four or five years ago feminism was stigmatized more but today public figures and writers are broaching the issue." Neshevets adds, "I'm not sure if this was a result of Maidan, but maybe things started to snowball as a result of rebellion."

Despite these improvements, there are serious reasons to doubt that Ukraine is somehow on the cusp of becoming a "modern country." So says Denis Pilash, another veteran of youth protest on the Maidan. I conduct my interview with Pilash in the lobby of Ukraina hotel, a retro, Soviet-era relic which hardly provides a modern backdrop. When I ask the activist to comment about the mood amongst his generation, the activist responds "I think that youth is more open, more liberal on social issues and more western than Russian youth." On the other hand, he adds that surveys show that the vast majority of Ukrainians "are still very conservative as far as accepting people of different races or sexual orientation" (for a longer discussion of the mood amongst young students, see here).

Kyiv has staked its reputation on police reform, which is supposed to kick-start Ukraine's supposed transformation toward modern, western values. Though Pilash is critical of many aspects of police reform, he concedes that authorities succeeded in providing adequate security during Kyiv's most recent gay pride march. It was the first time that police had provided such security for the parade, which historically has been subject to street attacks and intimidation. Though there were fears the far right would stage attacks on parade participants, such concerns fortunately did not come to pass. Pilash suspects the police were acutely aware of public relations optics, since "the march was also attended by American diplomats and the police had to provide a good picture for the West."

Despite this social progress, Pilash paints a rather bleak and decidedly anti-modern view of power relations in his country. Currently, the activist notes, Ukraine's main investors hail mysteriously from tiny Cyprus or the Virgin Islands. "You know it's got to be wealthy oligarchs like Dmytro Firtash or Rinat Akhmetov who are behind these investments in Ukraine and they get away with not paying any taxes here." Kyiv should close all loopholes for offshore tax havens, Pilash remarks, while imposing progressive taxation. Unfortunately, the activist says, oligarchs are still in power even though Maidan displayed a strong anti-oligarchic bent. "We need to destroy the system of oligarchic capitalism once and for all," Pilash declares.

Fiasco of Higher Education

Pilash isn't the only youth activist who has become frustrated with the slow pace of reform. Yegor Stadny, another veteran of Maidan protest, is the Executive Director of CEDOS, a Kyiv think tank focusing on educational policy. To be sure, he says, there have been some improvements since the Yanukovych era, for example in the field of public procurements which are now conducted online in a more transparent fashion. In other respects too, such as the creation of a national anti-corruption bureau, Ukraine has made some strides. Unfortunately, Stadny says, "the speed of progress is glacial. I am fearful that at some point in future, the pace of change will decrease to such a degree that the clock will basically be turned back."

Stadny is particularly riled about the pace of educational reform, which at first seems a bit ironic. On the surface at least, one of Maidan's greatest accomplishments was the successful passage of a law on Higher Education Reform. In tandem with legislation, universities now enjoy academic autonomy to teach whatever they please, however Stadny declares that the same people who had previously stood against higher education reform now find themselves in charge within the government. As a result, "rectors have basically halted everything short of university autonomy because they aren't interested in making systemic changes."

To hear Stadny speak, one gets the impression that Ukrainian universities represent the very antithesis of what modern education ought to stand for. The majority of rectors, for example, are doing their utmost to head off a "proper competitive atmosphere and culture within the university." Specifically, rectors seek to prevent open competition for job vacancies, be they teaching or administrative positions. Meanwhile, rectors appoint "compromised" staff to lead a national board on quality assurance, which is tasked with peer review. Stadny claims the rectors appoint people who are guilty of plagiarism "so they can be controlled." Faced with such daunting odds at university, as well as an unenviable job market, Ukrainian youth is feeling discouraged. Stadny tells me that more and more students are pursuing their studies abroad, and this represents a key "brain drain" for Ukraine.

As the advance guard of Maidan's reformist N.G.O. impulse, Stadny meets constantly with government ministers and staff. Officials tend to agree with his group's proposals on secondary and higher education reform, he says, but then they quickly change tack by claiming that "now isn't the proper time," or "the path you're advocating is too radical." Speaking candidly, Stadny remarks that he's frequently very close to simply blurting out "this is bullshit!" and standing up in the middle of meetings. "Look," the Maidan activist adds, "we paid the highest possible price during the revolt against Yanukovych when peopled died for their beliefs, and you are saying 'this reform is too radical'? This is completely insane!"

Odessa and the Duke de Richelieu

Having concluded my interviews in Kyiv, I head south to the Black Sea port of Odessa in the hope of getting a fuller picture of Ukraine's western ambitions. Historically, Odessa has always prized itself on being modern, tolerant, multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan. Throughout its history, Jews have played an important role in the cultural fabric of the city. Upon arrival, I pay a visit to Odessa's local archaeological museum where patrons are greeted with relics and statues from the city's ancient history of Greek colonization and settlement.

While walking around Odessa itself I am struck by the city's ornate neo-classical and over the top Moorish Venetian architecture dating back to Czarist times. And yet, the city's Black Sea boardwalk is desolate and abandoned. Having languished since the Belle Epoque, Odessa has a rather dilapidated air about it. If I were to collect bricks or materials from most any house in Odessa, I wonder, would they simply crumble into dust while lying in my hands?

Hoping to pierce the veil on Odessa's modern aspirations and mystique, I head across town to the city's old Jewish quarter. There, I speak with Sergei Ischenko, a local journalist and former Maidan political activist on the independent leftist circuit. When the revolt against Yanukovych erupted, Ischenko says, some activists went to Kyiv while others congregated on Odessa's Primorsky Boulevard, near the monument to Duke Emmanuel Armand de Richelieu, one of the city's founders.

Maidan protesters' psychological link to Richelieu is significant, since the nobleman is a prominent symbol of European Odessa. A kind of honorary foreigner, Richelieu was granted the rank of lieutenant colonel by Czarist authorities in 1795. Sometime later, he was made governor of Odessa, at which point the Duke promptly set about transforming the small village into a proper city. In tandem with his modern sensibilities, Richelieu cleaned up corruption, built port facilities, constructed a theater and encouraged trade.

In the wake of Maidan, will Odessa live up to its western heritage of modernity and the Duke de Richelieu? "There are two Odessas," Ischenko tells me as we chat in his apartment. "On the one hand, you have anti-Semitic pogroms against the Jews during the Czarist period, and on the other hand you have a more progressive and tolerant sensibility. It's a problem, however, because many people don't understand why tolerance is good and xenophobia is bad. Even amongst the more intellectual and educated set, there are xenophobic elements." Ischenko adds that anti-Semitism still exists, though it's slightly "under the radar" and isn't expressed publicly.

To hear the journalist speak, Odessa is a bundle of contradictions. The younger generation tends to be more multi-cultural and western, whereas older folk are more pro-Russian, right wing, xenophobic and religious. The latter may even admire the Czars as well as Stalin, while seeing little contradiction in such views since "this is entirely normal in Odessa." Maidan however has served to moderate extremist ideas, and "ethnic-based nationalism isn't popular, even within radical far right groups. Even some racist soccer hooligans now say that 'Crimean Tatars aren't all that bad, or the Jews aren't all that bad.'"

Meanwhile, Maidan has made some ethnic minorities more patriotic and could help integrate marginalized groups into wider society. Bizarrely, some ethnic minorities belong to right wing political groups in Odessa. "I know of one guy who is a Russian Jew," Ischenko says, "yet he is a member of Right Sektor. I also know an Asian person who was a member of a rightist group. That's Odessa!"

Despite the many contradictions, Ukraine still yearns for Western-style modernity. In a recent poll, 49% of Ukrainians favored E.U. integration while only 16% supported joining a Russian-led customs union. Yet three years on, veterans of Maidan protest are wondering whether the European Union is still interested in signing their country up for membership. Indeed, Kyiv's bid to sign an association agreement with the European Union, which was the initial spark which set off the Maidan revolution in the first place, has stalled.

The slow disintegration of the E.U. has not helped to assuage Ukrainian concerns. The departure of Britain from the E.U. via "Brexit" vote removed one of the West's foremost critics of Russian aggression. Amidst this crisis of confidence, Holland then added to Ukraine's woes by voting against Kyiv's E.U. bid via non-binding referendum. The Dutch referendum could block visa liberalization for Ukrainians interested in traveling to other E.U. nations. As a result of the electoral upset in Holland, Prime Minister Mark Rutte is legally bound to "reconsider" the entire agreement. Rutte is no doubt concerned about the rise of Geert Wilders, who has been hailed as the "Dutch Donald Trump," and the latter's anti-immigrant and Euroskeptic Party for Freedom. Now under pressure from rising right wing populism, Rutte has floated the idea of amending the E.U.-Ukraine association agreement with European officials so as to incorporate voters' input.

Ukraine may wonder whether Western Europe is vacillating. If Holland, the so-called bastion of modern values and tolerance, can no longer be considered a staunch ally then who can Kyiv actually trust? The Dutch vote is all the more ironic in light of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, which was shot down over Ukrainian territory by Russian separatists in July, 2014. Since two thirds of the passengers were Dutch, one might think The Hague would be more interested in embracing and protecting Ukraine from Russia, rather than running away from an E.U. association agreement.

Fraying Diplomatic and Military Ties

Lack of crucial diplomatic support from western quarters is profoundly dispiriting to many in Ukraine. Oleksandra Matviychuk, a coordinator of the Euromaidan SOS, a human rights initiative, recently expressed her frustrations. Speaking with Euro Maidan Press, she remarked, "From the point of view of ordinary Ukrainians, this is a betrayal behavior of the European Union. Ukrainians are probably the only people who died under E.U. flags for E.U. values. As a country, we fulfilled all the requirements for a free visa regime with the E.U., but this question is still on the agenda." Matviychuk adds, "Russia understands clearly that if Ukraine will be able to conduct democratic transformations, it will have an irreversible influence on the whole region. In particular, on post-Soviet countries, especially Russia, where freedom slowly narrows down to the level of the jail cell."

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) writes that even though Ukrainian public opinion still favors the E.U., morale has suffered. "The image of an E.U. racked by crises and too preoccupied to care about Ukraine is chipping away at this plurality," the group remarks, "as seen by the growing popularity of the 'Eurorealism' trope (as in, 'Let's be realistic, our prospects are not good')." With the West fracturing, there are indications that elite opinion in Ukraine might also be splintering. In a recent Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, wealthy oligarch Viktor Pinchuk remarked that Ukraine should give up on Crimea and withdraw its bid to join NATO and the E.U.

In exchange for such concessions, Pinchuk believes Kyiv could secure a successful peace deal in the east. Fellow oligarch Dmytro Firtash reportedly agrees with Pinchuk and seeks to revive trade with Russia. ECFR remarks, "Both men have a personal interest in their companies regaining access to Russian markets. But the campaign also anticipates and feeds a Trumpist agenda, when Ukrainians are profoundly split about how to approach his presidency after Trump's string of pro-Russian comments."

Meanwhile, as if these concerns weren't serious enough, Kyiv fears the newly-inaugurated Trump administration will betray Ukraine by "pushing for some kind of Yalta 2.0 agreement with Russia." Ukraine cannot defend itself alone, and given Trump's hostility toward NATO it seems unlikely the latter will expand its security umbrella toward Kyiv any time soon. Given such stark realities, Ukraine may seek more unusual defense arrangements with other Eastern European nations. Take, for example, Kiev's rapprochement with the so-called "Visegrad Group" comprising Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. With relations deteriorating with Russia as of late, the political and military bloc has been holding meetings about the situation in Ukraine. Though Kyiv has had its own stormy historic relations with Poland, the latter has been sounding increasingly eager to come to the defense of its eastern neighbor.

Back in Kyiv, I touch on the many ironies of Ukraine's situation with pro-Western bar owner Kanishthemko. Despite internal pressures within the E.U., he insists that "Europe and NATO are the only escape for Ukraine. We need to be backed up by someone in our relations with Russia." ECFR notes, however, that if Ukraine wants to get into the good graces of the E.U., the country "will need to get serious about tackling corruption and advertise some big reform success stories in the coming year." ECFR adds, "This may not be the top item on Trump's agenda, but European public opinion cares more about whether Ukraine is worth saving; and Kyiv needs to do much more to make a convincing case in this respect."

Whether Ukraine can muster the effort to follow through on Maidan's reformist impulse, however, remains to be seen. Irish Times notes that Maidan's third anniversary has been marred by widespread disillusionment as Ukrainians grapple with government failure to eliminate corruption, eviscerate the oligarchs or improve the economy while simultaneously addressing wealth inequality. President Poroshenko, meanwhile, finds himself surrounded by the pro-Russian Opposition bloc party on the one hand and far right Ukrainian nationalists on the other.

Back in Bar Baraban, Kanishthemko remarks wistfully, "Everyone was thinking that we would become Europe immediately but it takes time and our country was never exposed to the West." When I ask the bar owner whether Ukraine is living up to Maidan's aspirations to create a more multi-ethnic and tolerant society, he muses "Yes. But I think this tolerance in the West, which used to be one of the features of society, is now changing."

Note: for a version of this article with embedded slide show, see here.

Nikolas Kozloff is a New York-based writer and photographer.

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Ukraine: Reflections on the Maidan Revolution, a Voyage to Odessa, Donald Trump, Trans-Atlantic Disarray and ... - Huffington Post

Ukraine’s Problem Is Ukraine | Zero Hedge

Submitted by James Durso via RealClearDefense.com,

Ukraines government has hired Washington lobbyists to fix its problems with the Trump Administration, but would do better to fix its internal problems, instead.

Ukraines problems are in four categories: a structural problem caused by the multiple overlapping entities involved in military strategy and procurement; the absence of a unified strategic vision for ordering equipment and supplies; a Fifth Column of pro-Russian officials; and a staggering corruption that divides the self-interest of the elites from the national interest.

A recent Rand study highlighted the deficiencies in the command structure of Ukraines security sector. Defense procurement particularly has several overlapping structures with no clear lines of authority or unity of command. The President, Prime Minister, Defense Ministry, General Staff and the infamous state-owned defense company, Ukroboronprom, compete against and undercut one another. Each entity produces its own wish list, driven more by impulse than strategy, and each entity has separate financial controls, opening the door to insider dealing and corrupt sales of government property.

In Ukraine, citizens are played for suckers: local militias fight to preserve home and liberty, while the leaders focus on procedure, personal prestige, and offshore bank accounts. Ukroboronprom is infamous for selling arms to the black market, and domestic contracts are given to factories indirectly owned by President Petro Poroshenko, who still hadn't divested his business interests as he promised to do when he took office in 2014.

However, Ukraines political leaders are not fiddling while their country burns, they are busy stealing their military budgets -- nearly half, in the estimate of a former Ukrainian senior military officer who requested not to be identified. They reason that when the rest of Ukraine is swallowed up by Russia, they will have a well-funded Plan B.

But it is not just the corruption thats the problem. The system is plagued with inefficiency and lack of commitment. In 2015, at a time when the Ukrainians were complaining about the cost of spare tires and repairs, the U.S. government was prepared to ship them over 150 Humvees, along with spare parts and training - over $300 million worth of equipment. However, the government of Ukraine refused to spend $600,000 to pay the shipping cost.

Complicating these issues is the presence of the Russian Fifth Column. Many of the senior leadership -- military as well as political -- are loyal to President Putin, and they work actively to undermine Ukrainian independence. For them, corruption is a political tool as well as a means of personal enrichment. (That Plan B, again.)

The Ukrainian leadership can control their future only if they persuade the U.S. they are worth the effort. They need to make rapid and radical changes: abolish Ukroboronprom, let the Ministry of Defense focus on administration and procurement, and have the General Staff make the strategic decisions that drive supply requests. Moreover, it is time for President Poroshenko, the Defense Minister, the Chief of Staff and their deputies to put Ukraines interests above their own, resign their positions, and let someone who cares about defending Ukraine manage the defense effort.

If Ukraines leaders do not stop the corruption, the inefficiency, and the ridiculous turf battles, they will no longer have a country to loot, which may be what it takes to get their attention. The incoming Trump Administration and the Congress should condition aid on reform and transparency, as suggested by Rex Tillerson in his confirmation testimony in the Senate. Honest Ukrainian patriots should embrace those conditions, force out the kleptocrats, and lead the reform.

Ukraine should be able to preserve its territorial integrity and freely choose allies and trading partners. However, its leaders must show they are serious about meeting Western standards of governance: make their case for continued aid, and show how the aid will be used. This will be far more effective than the recent misguided attempts of the Poroshenko government to meddle in the U.S. elections. They need to make the same case to NATO and show that they are ready to become a responsible member of the West. Unless they do, Trump and his advisors will treat Ukraine like a bad investment and walk away. In fact, they may even press for investigations into what has happened to all the American aid and insist on repatriating it to either the U.S. or the Ukrainian people. Ukraines future is in Ukrainian hands.

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Ukraine's Problem Is Ukraine | Zero Hedge