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Ukraine is interested in implementing promising investment projects in the maritime sector in cooperation with American business.

Infrastructure Minister Kryklii said this during a webinar dedicated to the Maritime Infrastructure Modernization Program in Ukraine, which took place under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, the press service of the Infrastructure Ministry reports.

"We are open to investors and the implementation of promising investment projects in the maritime industry in cooperation with American business and are happy to invite you to invest in Ukraine," he said.

The infrastructure minister informed about the successful experience of implementing the first concession projects in the ports of Olvia and Kherson. According to him, the ministry is planning to implement next concessions in the industry.

"We are currently in the process of preparing concession projects in the seaports of Berdiansk, Izmail and Mariupol. We are also preparing a project of the concession for a passenger terminal in the Odesa Sea Port, the concession of a railway and ferry complex and a container terminal in the Black Sea port, he said.

The event was attended by U.S. Charg d'Affaires in Ukraine Kristina Kvien, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Trade Policy David de Falco, SPILNO Project Office Chair Taras Boychuk, Director of the Infrastructure Support Team Iryna Koshel, and representatives of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, EBRD, US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), U.S. Export-Import Bank, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, ADM Ukraine LLC, AVELLUM, Baker & McKenzie, Aon Ukraine, CHS Ukraine LLC and other companies.

The participants in the event also discussed the possible participation of American business representatives in the implementation of promising public-private partnership projects in the road sector.

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Excerpt from:
Ukraine interested in joint projects with U.S. business in maritime sector - Kryklii - Ukrinform. Ukraine and world news

LONDON (Reuters) - Ukraines top prosecutor said on Friday investigations into Ukrainian energy company Burisma Holdings Ltd, a matter closely tied to a scandal that led to former U.S. President Donald Trumps first impeachment, have been closed with no plans to reopen them.

FILE PHOTO: Prosecutor General of Ukraine Iryna Venediktova reacts during a parliamentary session in Kiev, Ukraine March 17, 2020. Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY./File Photo

Ukrainian prosecutors in recent years had looked into the actions of Burisma, a company on whose board U.S. President Joe Bidens son Hunter had served from 2014 to 2019, and its founder Mykola Zlochevsky.

Everything that prosecutors could do, they have done, Prosecutor General Iryna Venediktova said in an interview with Reuters by video link from Kyiv. This is why I dont see any possibilities (or) necessity to come back to these cases.

Venediktova also said U.S. authorities had made no requests of her office since Biden took office last month.

The U.S. House of Representatives impeached Trump in December 2019 on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress over his request in a July 2019 phone call to Ukraines president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, for an investigation into Biden and his son Hunter. The U.S. Senate voted in February 2020 to keep Trump in office.

Trump made unsubstantiated corruption allegations against both Bidens. U.S. Democrats accused Trump, a Republican, of soliciting foreign interference in an American election by trying to get a vulnerable ally to smear a domestic political rival, using American aid as leverage. Biden defeated Trump in the November U.S. election.

As vice president under President Barack Obama, Biden oversaw U.S. policy toward Ukraine and sought the removal of the countrys top prosecutor at the time, who the United States and Western European countries had viewed as corrupt or ineffective. Trump and his allies made unsubstantiated claims that Biden did so because the prosecutor had been looking into Burisma while his son served on the board.

Zlochevsky, a former Ukraine ecology minister, is now living abroad.

One Burisma probe had related to suspected tax violations. Burisma said in 2017 investigations into the company and Zlochevsky had been closed after it paid an additional 180 million hryvnias ($6.46 million) in taxes.

Venediktova, in her post for just under a year, said she wants to take a different approach in her job than predecessors she described as being too political.

Asked about Ukraines fight against corruption, Venediktova dismissed concerns that the independence of the national anti-corruption bureau, known as NABU, had been undermined after the government drafted new legislation on its status that the bureau said would harm its ability to fight high-level graft.

NABU is now an independent body and will be an independent body in future, Venediktova said.

Corruption has been a longstanding issue for Ukraine, and any threat to the independence of NABU, set up with the backing of Western donors, could further derail the flow of foreign aid at a time when its economy has been hammered by lockdowns related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The International Monetary Fund has told Ukraine it needs to adopt more reforms to unlock further funds from its $5 billion IMF programme.

Venediktova also said she is hopeful that legal cases surrounding PrivatBank would come to a conclusion before the end of the year. The central bank declared PrivatBank insolvent in 2016 and said its poor lending practices blew a $5.5 billion hole in its finances before it was taken into state hands. The lenders former owners dispute this and have fought to reverse the nationalisation.

($1 = 27.8492 hryvnias)

Reporting by Karin Strohecker in London and Matthias Williams in Kyiv; Additional reporting by Mark Hosenball in Washington; Editing by Will Dunham

The rest is here:
Ukraine prosecutor says there are no plans to revisit Burisma probes - Reuters

The Sectoral Sanctions are effective for a period of five years and include, in particular, the following restrictions:

Because the Sectoral Sanctions have been applied for the first time in Ukraine since the approval of the Sanctions Law in 2014, we anticipate further official clarifications and a new enforcement practice from the Ukrainian authorities clarifying the exact scope of the application of the Sectoral Sanctions.

We recommend that Ukrainian residents and foreign companies doing business in Ukraine carefully assess any dealings involving Nicaragua for their compliance with the Ukrainian sanctions restrictions.

1.Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 1167-IX dated 2 February 2021 On Approval of the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated 1 February 2021 On Imposing Sectoral Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions) against the Republic of Nicaragua' effective from 4 February 2021.

2. Law of Ukraine On Sanctions No. 1644-VII dated 14 August 2014 (Sanctions Law).

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Ukraine: The Parliament imposes its first-ever sectoral sanctions - GlobalComplianceNews

On 12 November 2020, the Ukrainian Parliament published a draft payment services law (available in Ukrainian), that was prepared with the Ukrainian central bank (NBU). Among other things, the draft law would implement a regulatory framework for open banking similar to the EUs PSD2 (Directive 2015/2366). PSD2 requires banks to share data from their clients payment accounts free of charge with third party providers (TPPs) without any underlying commercial agreement thereby allowing TPPs to offer new payment services to consumers.

Paul Rohan, in his book PSD2 in Plain English has suggested that in practical terms, open banking requires banks to build and publish an Application Programming Interface (API). An API permits a piece of software to read data from the system of the API publisher (in this case, a bank). Therefore, to comply with PSD2, a bank will publish an API, similar to publishing a website, and disclose relevant payment account data to all eligible TPPs.

Is the API economy an entirely new phenomenon in Ukraine?

Publication of APIs was not invented by the authors of PSD2; they were in use before the adoption of PSD2. For instance, many Ukrainian banks publish their own APIs to enable collaboration with the API developers community. In fact, according to one of the largest Ukrainian banks, it was the first bank globally to make a public API available for developers in September 2009, that is used today by approximately 5,000 API developers and clients in both Ukraine and abroad. Moreover, a number of banks publish a partner API, which is available to partner companies to facilitate commercial projects. In Paul Rohans view, a partner API is a stepping stone for a bank to offer a public API.

But the key difference between then and now is that before PSD2, the sharing of account data (i.e., publishing APIs) was not mandatory. In Ukraine, this particular aspect of PSD2 was the subject of much debate and controversy between the NBU and market participants. It was not clear until the publication of the draft law last November whether this requirement would be included in the text as opposed to a discretionary option.

It now looks like the Ukraine is to join those countries wanting to boost their digital economies by way of regulatory intervention Article 54 of the draft law makes it mandatory for banks to share data with TPPs. As result, the Ukraine will join those jurisdictions pursuing the regulatory intervention path. In particular, it may be allocated to a subgroup of countries (e.g., Albania and Northern Macedonia) that implement PSD2 under their existing association agreements with the EU and its Member States. Another group of jurisdictions have non-regulatory initiatives coordinated by market participants without the intervention of the state (e.g. USA, Nigeria etc.). The chart below shows the dynamics in this space, however, as this is a dynamic scenario new jurisdictions may appear on this map as we speak.

Standardization of APIs

It is curious that Paul Rohan compares APIs with an electricity wall socket, which is an interface with an electricity supply, with predictable patterns of opening in the wall sockets, so producers of electric appliances know what to expect. Likewise, APIs are useful in this context because it is not straightforward to pull data from a third party system (i.e., from banks numerous information systems). A standard API can make the operation of a TPP easier in the sense that it need not worry about how to access data, but rather focus on building the service it offers to the consumer. In other words, API developers should know what to expect, in terms of API features, when developing software and avoid reinventing the wheel each time they want to obtain data from a particular bank.

PSD2 itself did not address this issue. Rather, it instructed the European Banking Authority to develop the requirements for common and secure open standards of communication (RTSs), i.e., only technical framework conditions with no interface standard. To help fill this gap of a common standard, a number of market initiatives have emerged in EU, including a group of European banks and payment service providers, the Berlin Group, whose API framework is called NextGenPSD2. Similarly, the draft Ukrainian law envisages that the NBU will adopt data security and communication requirements concerning end users, banks and TPPs when accessing consumers accounts. Apparently, the question of an API standard is about to emerge.

The NBU have indicated that (i) the open banking launch may be feasible in Ukraine in 2022 and (ii) that it would launch a market stakeholders working group shortly to consult on the issue of API standardization. It seems that one of the options to move this initiative forward might be to leverage existing market experience of tech savvy banks in developing an API economy.

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Is Ukraine about to join the open banking race? - Lexology

At the end of last year, former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko (June 2014May 2019) announced in an interview that, back in 2018, he had initiated a special operation to detain mercenaries belonging to the notorious Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group (News.ru, December 31, 2020)a shadowy paramilitary outfit allegedly culpable in war crimes committed in Ukraine, Syria, Libya and Sub-Saharan Africa. Poroshenko additionally accused Ukraines current ruling elites of sabotaging the operation last summer and promised to pursue the matter until all traitors have been punished. This highly controversial episode established a dangerous new precedent with potentially far-reaching repercussions for Ukraine.

The story Poroshenko was referring to first came to light on July 29, 2020, when Belarusian law enforcement detained 33 men near Minsk (Tut.by August 7, 2020). The local authorities claimed that the groupapparently all Wagner mercenariesarrived in Belarus to take part in igniting mass anti-governmental provocations ahead of the approaching presidential elections (August 9, with early voting August 48). Despite the seriousness of the accusations and vigorous protestation of the Ukrainian government, which demanded the arrested individuals extradition, almost all members of the group were soon sent back to Russia. In time, however, the story developed further, revealing new details and stunning claims. Specifically, Ukrainian sources alleged that the detention of the Wagner militants in Belarus was, in effect, part of a failed special operation that sought to trick the mercenaries into arriving in Kyiv, where the group was to have been apprehended and brought to justice (News.ru, October 12, 2020). According to Ukraine, at least 9 out of the 33 men were Ukrainian citizens, and all of them allegedly took part in hostilities in southeastern Ukraine. Kyiv accused some of them of, among other crimes, shooting down (on July 17, 2014) Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, which resulted in 298 fatalities. Interestingly, while official Russian information sources either remained silent or shrugged off these charges, one Russian conservative writer who had himself volunteered to fight in Ukraine, Zakhar Prilepin, openly admitted that there are two or three fighters [among the detained Wagner members] from my battalion (Ura.news, July 29, 2020).

The incident triggered an acute political fracas inside Ukraine, particularly after Minsk handed 32 of the mercenaries (one had Belarusian citizenship) over to Moscow on August 14. Rival Ukrainian political factions began to accuse one another of treason and/or of spreading disinformation. Two main claims emerged from this infighting in Kyiv.

According to the firstprimarily expressed by representatives of the current Ukrainian ruling elitethe entire narrative regarding the detention of the Wagner members in Belarus was nothing more than Russian disinformation aimed at compromising Ukraine. Denying the basis of the story entirely, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy harshly criticized those who spread disinformation [] about some sort of a special operation (NV, January 5). Zelenskyys statement echoed earlier disavowals by Andriy Yermak, the head of the Presidential Administration, who, in mid-August, suggested that the failed Wagner kidnap theory had been concocted by forces within Ukraine eager to derail the ceasefire in the Donbas region. Likewise, Kirill Budanov, the chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (HUR MOU), claimed that no special operation was taking place since it would have been impossible to trick Wagner fighters to come to Belarus without Russias knowledge (NV, August 19, 2020).

This refutation, however, met with staunch opposition from a number of authoritative Ukrainian and foreign experts. For instance, Christo Grozev, of the open-source investigative team Bellingcat, contended that, according to unearthed evidence, the Ukrainian intelligence services came up with a brilliant plan to upstage Russian military intelligence, the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Wagner Group, but that this plan was derailed by the Ukrainian authorities. In his comment, Grozev characterized the alleged actions of the Ukrainian ruling circles as either treason or [driven by] political fear (Censor.net, December 22, 2020).

An even harsher assessment came from a renowned military journalist and the editor-in-chief of the information outlet Censor.net, Yurii Butusov, who de facto openly accused members of the Presidential Administration (Andriy Yermak and others) of treasonous behavior and sabotaging a special operation as a means to avoid tensions with Moscow (NV, August 19, 2020). Butusov claimed that Yermak is not the only person keenly interested in normalizing Russian ties, whatever the cost might be. According to the Censor.net editor, the National Security and Defense Councils First Deputy Secretary Ruslan Demchenkoa political figure tolerated by Poroshenko and promoted by Zelenskyyhas been playing a largely destructive role, remaining a direct threat to Ukrainian national security. With these remarks, Butusov implicitly accused Zelenskyy (not just his inner circle) of treachery against the state (Censor.net, August 18, 2020).

That said, the publicly available information on the purported foiled special operation lacks key details needed to confirm it; although some more recent developments have raised additional suspicions. For example, following the outbreak of the scandal, Zelenskyy without explanation denied a motion of the then-head of the HUR MOU, Vasyl Burbareportedly, in charge of the special operationto administer polygraph tests to Yermak and others who claimed knowledge of the failed Wagner capture scheme. On top of that, Burba was fired soon afterwards by presidential decree. Similarly, according to some Ukrainian sources, the aforementioned special operation collapsed due to the fact that the date of the final stage was changed by Zelenskyy, which allowed the Belarusian special cervices to apprehend the mercenaries on their territory to later hand them over to Moscow (Plus.obozrevatel.com, October 11, 2020).

Irrespective of whether the reported failed special operation is true or not, the scandal carries serious consequences. With respect to Belarus, this incidentas well as post-election domestic developments in generalclearly demonstrated the extent of President Alyaksandr Lukashenkas current dependency on Russia. Yet it is Ukraine that has attracted most of the negative consequences of the Wagner fighters arrest just outside Minsk. Specifically, the affair spotlighted two important issues. First, the dueling charges and denials underscored the intolerably high level of internal division within Ukraines ruling elite, where conflicting factions are eager to use all means necessaryeven reveal purported state secretsto hurt their opponents, with little consideration of the repercussions for national security. Second, if the alleged special operation was, indeed, derailed because of treasonous actions of some policymakers (as certain experts have argued), then this shows that Moscows penetration of the statewhich facilitated Russias hybrid annexation of Crimea and separatist war in southeastern Ukrainehas still not been effectively dealt with by Ukrainian counter-intelligence since 2014.

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The 'Wagner Affair' in Belarus and Its Implications for Ukraine - Jamestown - The Jamestown Foundation