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Deep down in eastern Ukraine last spring, a motley crew of militant Russian nationalists with mafia-style nicknames such as The Gherkin and so on spearheaded the uprising against Kievs authority after the revolution there. In 2014, these paramilitaries might have been doing Putins bidding, and couldnt have operated from Russia without his consent. But their alliance with the Kremlin was very recent and predicated on its split with the West.

Putins government, however, has constantly talked as though the sanctions crisis is only a temporary phenomenon. Soon, normal economic ties, money-laundering through the City, and so on, will be renewed has been the sub-text of the Kremlins line.

But the rag-bag of self-proclaimed Cossacks and defenders of a New Russia want to be ostracised by the West. For them, eliminating pro-Western voices such as Nemtsovs made perfect sense. He embodied what they hated and his murder makes any rapprochement between Putin and the West unthinkable.

Nemtsov was tragically aware that he might be killed as a Western scapegoat. He recognised that his call for Russia to abandon nostalgia not just for the recent Soviet past but for imperial Russia, too, put him on a collision course with a growing majority in the country.

Nationalist websites identified the opposition politician as a treacherous Western agent, while Nato expansion to Russias shrunken post-Communist borders fed the alienation of many Russians who had originally welcomed the collapse of Communism.

I remember Nemtsov pleading with Margaret Thatcher to use her influence to stop Nato expanding into Russias backyard because it would revive anti-Western nationalism. He didnt see the West as a threat, but knew Russians saw its defence wing as one. Because Russians are well aware of the hostility of the Baltic States, for instance, to their old masters in Moscow, the Nato expansion to include Soviet territory was seen as the vanguard of a potential war of revenge by the ex-subject peoples. The Ukraine crisis is the clearest symptom of that.

This external pressure has generally rallied Russians behind Putin. But if he loses his reputation as the man who can guarantee law and order at home, then his hold on public opinion could slip. Yeltsins popularity plummeted under the double impact of deep recession and a crime wave. Putins strongman image could haunt him if nationalist paramilitaries shift their fire from Ukraine closer to home. The Kremlin has sponsored the nationalist tiger, but may not control it.

In the meantime, those hoping for Putins fall should remember what the Chinese have long warned us: be careful of what you wish for. From Whitehall to Washington, there is a nave assumption that anyone but Putin must be better for Russia and the West. But has anyone-must-be-better-than-Gaddaffi been true for Libyans, or us, since 2011?

The devil you know is always more predictable than chaos.

The collapse of the Communist system was largely bloodless. Lets not assume that the collapse of post-Communist Russia would not send shockwaves westwards. In 1991, the nuclear arsenal passed peacefully to the Kremlins new masters. Who will control them after Putin? Will they be easier to deal with?

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With the murder of Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Putin's attack dogs have slipped the leash