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Second treaty of Maastricht brings full union closer

By John Palmer in Brussels7 February 1992

Foreign and finance ministers from the 12 member states will today sign a treaty which aims to turn the European Community into an economic union and a global political power, before the end of the decade.

They will do so in the Dutch city of Maastricht, which last December saw the bruising climax to years of negotiations for a treaty on European Union.

The Commission, the European parliament, and most EC governments see the Maastricht treaty as an interim stage in the process leading to full European union. The treaty is a legally and politically messy compromise, between the majority who wanted to move faster to union and a minority primarily but not exclusively the British who were determined to slow down if not reverse the trend towards a de facto federal union.This is an edited extract. Read in full.

By Julie Wolf in Maastricht8 February 1992

The French almost missed the show, Norman Lamont opted out and Douglas Hurd wasnt sure what he had signed. But compared to the last time the European Communitys foreign and finance ministers got together in Maastricht, yesterdays ceremony to sign the Treaty on European Union was a breeze.

The Dutch province of Limburg pulled out the stops. There were hussars and a band to welcome the dignitaries, glorious spring flowers everywhere, the Limburg Symphony Orchestra playing Mozart and, of course, a champagne reception and banquet.

Still, there were some hitches. The French delegation, led by the foreign minister, Roland Dumas, and the finance minister, Pierre Beregovoy, steamed in after the pre-signing speeches had started, apparently delayed by a parliamentary debate on the Habash affair. The new Europe goes ahead even without the French, one onlooker commented.

Mr Hurd, meanwhile, responded with an embarrassed laugh when asked what was contained in the two bound volumes the ministers autographed. We had better find out what we signed, the foreign secretary accompanied by Treasury Eurosceptic Francis Maude, standing in for the Chancellor, Mr Lamont was heard telling officials.

Whatever it was, it would not lead to a federal Europe, Mr Hurd said. Logic was now running against more centralisation, with a Europe of 17 or 18 nations likely in the not-so-far-off future.

This was a view not shared by the president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, who used his speech to call for a federal Europe, while insisting he was not trying to reopen an old argument.

For the Dutch prime minister, Ruud Lubbers, the treaty was just one step to ever closer union: with would-be members queueing up, he said, negotiations on a new political union treaty might have to begin before 1996.

8 February 1992

With the Maastricht treaty just signed, and Portugals presidency only in its second month, the foreign secretarys unveiling of our new EC logo may appear slightly odd timing. (Not to dwell on the oddness of the logo itself, in which the lion remains half outside the EC symbol.) To announce British presidential priorities five months before we take over begs a fairly large electoral question. Yet it does focus minds otherwise preoccupied upon the vast range of issues raised by European Union which have oddly faded since last years storms. It also poses two very necessary questions: how to ensure a smooth presidential transition, and how to define the enlargement which Britain (like Portugal) sees rightly as an urgent task.

The six monthly EC presidential cycle generates an arbitrary but on the whole positive sort of democracy by alphabet. Though unkind words have been said about the recent sequence of presidential terms by Europes smaller nations (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and now Portugal) there are advantages in the perspective from a smaller power base. Portugal has largely shaken free of the Atlanticist outlook which once placed it at the same table with Britain. Six years of growth since entering the Community has created a feeling of benefit in Lisbon which Britain does not share. Its energetic Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro says he hopes to pay back this help by working hard on a European approach. Portugal has its own interests, particularly in agriculture where its farmers will be served by the pursuit of a reform which is neither radical or superficial. But Lisbon can still talk more credibly of a universalist approach than Paris or Bonn or London with their substantial and sensitive national interests. Portugals location also encourages a proper concern that the South, both of Europe and beyond, may suffer if western resources and attention are focused exclusively upon eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union. Portugals commitment to press ahead at once with all the dossiers which have been generated by Maastrichts three pillars, rather than establish priorities, may yet come unstuck by June. But in a period when the main task is to establish new structures and agendas for political and economic union which flow from the decisions of the last summit, such a broadly based effort still makes sense.

The issue of enlargement has itself been potentially enlarged by the mounting pace of disintegration in the east since Maastricht was agreed. The task for the Portuguese presidency ahead of the next Lisbon summit is to define both an adequate strategy and its institutional consequences. The EFTA applicants clearly have to be dealt with first, but how much wider should the EC go, and how soon? The Treaty of Rome should not be a closed club, but different forms of decision making will have to be devised for a Community which could number 15 quite soon and 20 or more by the end of the decade. By the normal economic criteria even Hungary and Poland would hardly be ready to join by the next review in 1996. But are these necessarily the right tests to apply? The ECs patronage in central and eastern Europe serves a far more urgent purpose of immunisation against the risks of instability, even without formal defence guarantees. The real task may be how to find new forms of association, with much more meaningful political body, in which the frontiers can be extended without diluting the ECs core strength. Enlargement has been tarnished by the suspicion that it can serve as an alibi for slowing the agreed pace of union. But the EC may yet be faced with new crises in the east which inevitably result in some slackening of effort elsewhere.

Beyond the Treaty and enlargement lies the still broader role of the EC as a future superpower. Here too a country which in modern times has never claimed great power status may more easily regard the EC as a great world actor. Certain EC members, Lisbon suggests, could play a more prominent part in dealing with areas where they have special leverage, as Portugal itself does over East Timor. Similarly as the Middle East peace process flags, it would be appropriate for Britain particularly when it becomes president to claim a higher EC role.

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Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht archive, 1992 - The Guardian