The War in Iraq Exposed Huge Flaws in American Strategic Thinking – The National Interest

As seenrecently,intermittentaltercationspersistin Iraqand Syriabetween American forces and various Iran-backed militias. These, however,stem from, andare a continuation of,a fundamental error in the design of the war. Thisshould have beenapparentto its instigators even beforethe warwas launched in 2003,andit isalmost breath-taking in its naivet.

An extensive U.S.Armystudyof the warcontendsthat the overwhelming majority of decisions in the Iraq War were made by highly intelligent, highly experienced, leaders. However, it concludesthat the failure to achieve our strategic objectivesderived from reasoning that contained systemic failures, and high among these was that U.S. leaders seemed to believe that other regional nations would not react.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,President GeorgeW. Bush, whohadcome into office proposing a humble foreign policy,abruptlyreversed course. He nowproclaimedthat the countrys responsibility to history wasnowto rid the world of evilquite the boast given human history.

Then, a few months later, Bush specified ina major speech that, while evil presumablylurkedeverywhere,a special axis of evil existed,and it wasprimarily located inNorth Korea, Iran, and Iraq.

Iranfully realized it was in trouble, as didSyria,which alsosometimesappearedon the target listprovided almost daily by Bush and his coterie of cheer-leadingneoconservatives.If they needed further confirmation,defense advisorRichardPerle exultantlysuggestednot longafter the invasion of Iraq that a short messageshould now bedeliveredto other hostile regimes in the area: Youre next.

It was accordinglyclearly in the best, even supreme,interest of theregimes running North Korea and Syriatowork closely with, andtoprovide sanctuary for, friendlyShiasinIraq to make the American tenure inIraq as miserable as possible.Meanwhile, similarly threatenedNorth Koreaformally withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty andworkeddedicatedly to obtain nuclear weaponsto deter an American attack.

In addition to Iran and Syria, otheroutsiders weredrawn to Iraq anddedicated to sabotaging theoccupierspeace and to killingitsoccupyingforces.Inparticular,a Jordanian,Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,a Sunniwho sympathized with al-Qaedas ideology and agenda,becamethe leader of a small army of dedicated and brutal terrorists numbering perhaps in the thousands.

Zarqawisconnection toal-Qaeda may have helpedtoattract recruitsandtogeneratefinancial and logistical support, andhe wasfurther benefited by the tendency of the Americans to credithis forceswith a far larger portion of the violence inIraq than they probably committed,a process that also helped to burnish Zarqawis image in much of the Muslimworld as a resistance hero.

However,themindless brutalitiesof Zarqawis forcesstaging beheadings at mosques, bombing playgrounds, taking over hospitals,executing ordinary citizens, performing forced marriageseventually provedto be self-destructive, turning Iraqis against them, including many of thosewho had previously been fighting the American occupation either on theirown or in connection with Zarqawi.

Helped enormously by the alienation between jihadist marauders and Iraqitribes, the U.S.military was ableto bring civil warfare under somedegree of control in Iraq by 2009. However, the campaign to do sothe surge,it was calledcostover 1,000 American lives, seven times greaterthanthe United Stateshad lost in the 2003 invasion.

Zarqawis Sunni forces were thus eventually defeated,butthis came aboutonly aftertheyhad visited considerable destruction upon the occupiers.

On the other hand, Iran continued, and continues, to be a harassing element,impelled as wellnowbyresentment overthe sanctions leveled against it. Indeed, the Army study strikingly, if dismally,concludes in its assessment of the warin Iraqthat Iran appears to be the only victor.

In2010,brieferspointedoutto topAmericangeneralsin Afghanistanthat no counterinsurgencyefforton record had succeededwhen the insurgents had access to adeep cross-border sanctuary.Although they added thatthattheyhopedthe situation inAfghanistan would prove to be an exception, it has not proven to beonemore thana decade later.

The related experience in Iraq suggests that the briefers had it essentially right. Unless the United States wants directly to go to all-out war with Irancreating yet another disaster in the Middle Eastthe Iranians can keep this up forever.

John Mueller is a political scientist at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. His book, The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case forComplacency,has justbeen publishedby Cambridge University Press.

Image: Reuters.

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The War in Iraq Exposed Huge Flaws in American Strategic Thinking - The National Interest

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