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The crisis in Libya comes in the context of wider unrest throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The surge of what looks like spontaneous and ground up pro-democracy protests has been spreading throughout a region long controlled by authoritarian regimes from left and right of the political spectrum, and both pro and anti-West.

Since Libyas Muammar Qadhafi came into power over 40 years ago in a coup, he has been seen as an international pariah and his brutal willingness to kill civilians that threaten his position has been clear for all to see. Yet, until the recent crisis, the West had been opening up to him and was keen to do (mostly oil and some arms) business with him as they have been with various others in the region.

Peaceful protests against the Qadhafi regime in February resulted in a violent crackdown. As the situation quickly escalated ordinary citizens took up arms to help free themselves from Qadhafis brutal regime. Despite some military defections, the opposition has generally been a disorganized and out-gunned rebel force.

As Qadhafis forces increasingly targeted civilians the opposition appealed to the international community for a no-fly zone to limit or prevent the bloodbath that Qadhafi threatened.

The West appears to have responded with what looks like a genuine humanitarian intervention attempt. Yet, when looked at a bit more deeply, there are many murky often contradictory issues coming to the fore that complicate the picture.

(Side note about Qadhafi spelling: the UN Security Council resolution uses Qadhafi, while various reports using Qaddafi, Gaddafi, or some other variation. This article will try to be consistent but quotes may use variations.)

The current conflict comes as protesters demand an end to the current regime and democratic elections in Libya, a country ruled by Colonel Muammar Qadhafi for over 40 years when he lead a coup against King Idris and established the Libyan Arab Republic.

His rule has been oppressive, banning dissent and the formation of any other political parties, while also committing state-sponsored terrorism in the past. Oil revenues have accounted for a large portion of revenues, and his family is accused of amassing a large fortune (which is one of the reasons he supposedly overthrow the monarchy for).

Qadhafi had aligned himself with the Soviet Union in earlier years, and supported the idea of a Pan African movement for a United States of Africa (though probably with some notion of self-interest in any Pan Africa as he saw himself at the helm or at least with enormous influence). While claiming to be anti-imperialist he has been comfortable with his own forms of control, brutality and subjugation of others.

His support of terrorism abroad also resulted in the US bombing of Libya in 1986. In 1993 the UN imposed sanctions on Libya. It is possible these may have had some effect (though he did sponsor terrorist acts after the 1986 bombing too, possibly in retaliation) as Qadhafi eventually established closer economic and security relations with the West. He also agreed to end his nuclear weapons program and so the sanctions were lifted in 2003.

He also cooperated with some investigations of previous acts of terrorism and paid some compensation. The release of the Lockerbie bomber and return to Libya was perhaps more recently controversial.

In response to the 2011 uprising that was initially quite peaceful, he has been quite defiant threatening many civilian lives if needed. The uprising has since turned into an armed rebellion and numerous diplomats and military personnel have defected over the increasingly violent reaction by the ruling regime.

The generally untrained and disorganized rebel forces have, however, been out-gunned so far (though as a current conflict as of writing, the situation is of course volatile and could change quickly).

Qaddafis brutal response escalated the situation. The opposition, centered in Benghazi, worried about possible massacres from the regime. The international community, it seemed, were slow to respond, but eventually UN Security Council resolutions threatened the regime with war crimes prosecution if the situation worsened and eventually also allowed for a no-fly zone to be established to protect civilians.

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Into March, Qaddafi threatened to destroy those who resisted and some of his forces started to close in on Benghazi (where the opposition had created a Transitional National Council in the second city).

The West found themselves in a precarious situation. If they delayed, they would have been criticized for not aiding the civilians, and if they acted theyd be criticized for yet more military actions.

As calls for help from the beleaguered opposition grew, they decided they had to act, even as repression in other countries (though admittedly not threatening such imminent destruction as was thought in Libya) in the region were going on unchallenged.

The UN Security Council followed up on an earlier Resolution 1970 calling for restraint and reporting to the International Criminal Court for any human rights violations with Resolution 1973 in mid-March to authorize a no-fly zone to protect civilians.

The Resolution confusingly allowed all necessary measures, to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack but explicitly exclud[ed] a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.

All necessary measures caused confusion because Western powers insisted that the resolution was not to overthrow Qadhafi even though that is what many leaders were vocally calling for in the mainstream media and some initial bombing of Qadhafis compound seemed to imply (as Qadhafi was not threatening civilians in his compound). In addition, no ground troops excluded possible measures from all necessary measures, as some have argued that ground troops might be a more effective barrier to the Qaddafi forces.

At the same time, the Wests appetite for anything military that is more than a no-fly zone has been tainted or restrained by fear of public backlash given how stretched they are in Afghanistan and Iraq and how terrible those experiences have been. (The opposition had also stated they did not want ground troops, just protection from aerial bombing, hoping that would be enough to see the regime crumble.)

There has also been talk of arming the opposition with better arms as what they have is no match to Qaddafis forces. Yet, the resolution prohibits arms into Libya.

The resolution may have been intentionally vague to try and get broad support for it. It may have been weak because of the rush. This may have combined to create the contradictory messages but it was enough for Western forces to kick start the bombing campaign.

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The bombing campaign started very quickly after the Resolution authorized a no-fly zone and French jets started the first wave of attacks. The US was keen to be seen as just a part of an overall coalition, not the leader of it and so it joined later with a barrage of cruise missiles on various military targets.

Around the time the bombing commenced, Qadhafi seemed in a precarious position: the uprising seemed to be increasing, various high profile defections were occurring and he was sounding increasingly delusional in his defiant and bizarre speeches.

There were hopes this would be a short operation:

The military intervention that we had requested, we are quite confident that the moment that it is applied, that it isthat a step towards it is taken, the Gaddafi regime would fall within 48 hours. We dont expect it to survive more than that.

Maybe it was optimism or lack of full information but clearly the regime has carried on, perhaps even more resolute to act, now that it sees itself defying the West.

A useful infographic from Wikipedia shows what coalition forces have been involved in the no-fly zone enforcement/bombings:

The bombing campaign has also been met with criticism by initial supporters, perhaps surprisingly.

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The West was extremely keen to get Arab League support for any action. It would give a sense of legitimacy for the Wests actions as it would help avoid any military response look like yet more Western imperialism or Western attack on yet another Islamic country.

The corrupt, authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies of almost all the rulers from the countries that make up the Arab League makes them illegitimate in the eyes of their own populations, undermining Western claim of legitimacy from the Arab people by gaining Arab League support.

Furthermore, a full Arab representation has been described as a myth, as Asia Times Online noted:

As Asia Times Online has reported, a full Arab League endorsement of a no-fly zone is a myth. Of the 22 full members, only 11 were present at the voting. Six of them were Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, the US-supported club of Gulf kingdoms/sheikhdoms, of which Saudi Arabia is the top dog. Syria and Algeria were against it. Saudi Arabia only had to seduce three other members to get the vote.

Translation: only nine out of 22 members of the Arab League voted for the no-fly zone. The vote was essentially a House of Saud-led operation, with Arab League secretary general Amr Moussa keen to polish his CV with Washington with an eye to become the next Egyptian President.

In addition, when the bombing did commence, the Arab League voiced their concern at the bombing of various targets, as they believed it was not consistent with enforcing a no-fly zone. The leagues secretary general Amr Moussa said What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone. And what we want is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians. The Washington Post reporting this also added,

Moussas declaration suggested that some of the 22 Arab League members were taken aback by what they have seen and wanted to modify their approval lest they be perceived as accepting outright Western military intervention in Libya. Although the eccentric Gaddafi is widely looked down upon in the Arab world, the leaders and people of the Middle East traditionally have risen up in emotional protest at the first sign of Western intervention.

This goes back to the resolutions vagueness with the all necessary measures clause, while Western involvement implying no ground troops and a no-fly zone only was the assumption of the Arab League. In other words, the Resolution gave excuses for everyone to agree while still appealing to potentially opposing or hostile local opinions.

But, as US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates made clear before the resolution,

If [the no-fly zone is] ordered [by the UN], we can do it. But the reality is a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses. Thats the way you do a no-fly zone.

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Some fear the conflict could drag on for a while as the UN resolution is limited in its mandate, the opposition is not organized militarily and the implementation of that resolution by coalition forces does not appear to entertain any option for giving Qadhafi a way out to stop this (for now).

Instead, as noted earlier, Western powers insisted that the UN resolution did not authorize overthrowing Qadhafi even though that is what many leaders were vocally calling for in the mainstream media at the same time.

As US news anchorman, Chris Mathews fears Qaddafi will cling onto power if there is no way out, meaning more bloodshed:

We say we want to overthrow Gaddafi again but give him no place to escape. If thats the nature of this contest, he will fight to the death as most people would and that will mean the deaths of countless people who would survive if we had a quicker, smarter plan that promised a quicker, smarter ending to this thing.

I dont like the looks of this campaign for the simple reason it looks like so many others. In an effort to reduce our footprint, were making it a far longer, more bloody journey to where we're headed in the end.

Asli Bali, professor of International Law at the UCLA School of Law, also raises concerns that even the first UN Security Council resolution disincentivizes Qadhafi from stepping down quickly:

So, either, on the one hand, you exceed what the Security Council has authorized by pursuing regime change, or you pursue what the Security Council has authorizednamely, a ceasefireand you risk potentially freezing a situation on the ground that results in some form of partition.

There were many ways to get to that scenario that would not have entailed even the first Security Council authorization, since, for example, the ICC referral, the referral to the International Criminal Court, is counterproductive insofar as it says to the regime that youre going to face a form of international accountability that disincentivizes exile, that disincentivizes the regime from leaving rapidly. So, from the outset, I feel as if the Security Councils interventions in this instance have been, I think, poorly framed if the goal here has been rapid transition to a post-Gaddafi scenario with sparing of the civilian population, of killing.

Were alternatives possible? Asli Bali added that the International Crisis Group had suggested the option of peacekeeping forces on the ground before the UN Resolution. The force would act as a buffer between Qadhafi and civilians. Diplomatic pressure in the meanwhile could have been increased to get Qadhafi to step down or reform etc.

Are such peace-keeping forces still an option? Both Qadhafi and Coalition forces have been quite vocal about being against any form of ground troops. But that has typically been in the context of the current campaign.

Whether peoples positions would have been different if the military option had not developed so quickly is hard to know. Even if peacekeeping troops had been agreed to, who would the peacekeeping troops be? African Union and Arab League mandated forces?

There has been some concern that African Union forces may not have the clout, or may be influenced by Qadhafi as he has often funded them in the past. The Arab League is hardly representative of good governance. Western forces would likely be unwelcome even as peacekeeping troops. Would Latin America or Asian countries step in?

Another option being considered is arming the opposition further and officials from coalition countries are (perhaps intentionally) sending mixed messages on this option. On first thought it seems contradictory to the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 that both talked of an arms embargo on the whole of Libya (though clause 9(c) in 1970 talks of exemptions if approved by a Committee that would report to the Security Council). Resolution 1973 also talked of all necessary measures to prevent civilian deaths. Both aspects can be used to justify support for, or reasons against, arming the opposition.

Before those resolutions, Qadhafi had told supporters gathered in Green Square that he would arm them if needed. Whether that has since happened is not known for sure, but the arms embargo that later came was clearly addressed at that and similar threats, including the use of mercenaries.

Will the West rush to arm (directly or through proxy nations) rebel forces to better withstand and take on Qadhafi without Wests (visible) involvement, just as Qadhafi rushes to arm loyalists? If so, is this going to degrade into a protruded civil war?

A number of mainstream media outlets also reported that Obama had reportedly signed a secret order to help opposition fighters with covert operations. Al Jazeera added to their report on this (previous link) the views of William Hague, the British foreign minister, who implied that the USs action contradicted the UN arms embargo and that the restrictions in our view, apply to the whole of Libya while the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, added: I remind you it is not part of the UN resolution, which France sticks to, but we are ready to discuss it with our partners.

(These contradictions could turn out to be intentional. A not-so-secret, or intentionally leaked report about such secret orders and mixed messages from coalition partners who you would expect to be united on this behind the scenes could be used to confuse the Libyan regime (as well as other audiences), or keep it guessing. The Fog of War clouds everything and truth is often the first casualty of war, as it is often said.)

John Norris, Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative, lamented at the dilemmas long before the UN resolution and offered some options:

If we arm the opposition, what happens if some of those weapons fall into unfriendly hands? Do we really think that the situation in the Middle East requires more weapons on the ground? Or what if we impose a no-fly zone and attacks on the ground continue or escalate? Do we consider resorting to a ground offensive? Do we want the United States involved in three ground wars in three Islamic countries at the same time? Neither the rebels nor our national interest would benefit from a half-hearted intervention that does not achieve its goals.

With this in mind, here are the things that the administration should do right now. Fortunately, they appear to be trying to work through them already:

Although explaining the course of action to the public is always problematic (spin, propaganda, etc), it has been many weeks since the above. Even after the UN resolution, a lot of options appear to have remained on the table, so to speak, although there are various mixed messages from different circles. Perhaps public mixed messages also serves to keep Qadhafis regime guessing. More and more defections may also help to undermine Qadhafi.

Another blunt reason the West needs to think about diplomatic options is, as former head of UKs armed forces said, the UK is spreading its forces very thin and a political resolution in Libya must be found quickly.

As the BBC noted, he also warned against loose talks of arming the rebels which smacks of mission creep and could jeopardize support from Arab states.

We are on a high wire without any safety net and in the hands of opinion formers who could so quickly turn to our disadvantage these developments - are we not very close to being accused of involvement and taking sides in a Libyan civil war?

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As numerous journalists have reported, although the opposition forces are very passionate about the rebellion, they are generally not professional soldiers (some military personnel have defected and are slowly trying to instill discipline).

As a result, they have tended to be ineffective at pushing back Qadhafis forces who are professional soldiers (some may be mercenaries too).

In some cases, even after coalition bombing may have helped push back regime forces, the rebels have not been able to capitalize and have lost that gained ground, sometimes even pushed further back.

The other concern raised by many journalists and commentators before the bombing began was how coalition forces would know from the air who is enemy and who are rebels and who are civilians.

The reason is that rebel forces use civilian vehicles such as cars and pick-up trucks, as do civilians. But crucially, even Qadhafis army uses these vehicles so from the air, targets may be hard to verify.

It requires good ground intelligence, and with the coalition unwilling to have ground troops, the risk of hitting civilians or rebellions has long been feared.

Indeed, on April 2, NATO forces did just that, killing at least 13 rebels it is thought.

This is the last thing the coalition forces would want because any problem like this quickly threatens to escalate into opposition to coalition presence.

A few days earlier, a NATO strike on an ammunition truck sent shrapnel into nearby houses killing some civilians, including children. (A doctor interviewed on television described it but the journalist also said that talking to rebels, they wanted more strikes to take out such vehicles even if it meant some civilian deaths; that had those Qadhafi trucks got further the massacre would have been worse.)

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Perhaps in the context of the Iraq debacle, the global financial crisis, the shifts in world and economic power and the wider Middle East unrest, the crisis in Libya reveals a number of geopolitical issues.

Many question why the West is intervening in Libya militarily while other countries such as Bahrain or Yemen or Ivory Coast (with perhaps as many if not more killed in violence) are not getting such attention?

And this is not just a recent issue, but a common complaint for whenever there have been conflicts in the name of humanitarian intervention as they all appear selective.

Stephen Zunes of Foreign Policy In Focus adds that based on number of civilian deaths, Libya has been similar to other places that have been dealt with quite differently:

Even if one can justify the war on Libya on humanitarian grounds, this is probably not why its actually being fought.

It would nave to claim that foreign intervention is prompted by Western leaders concern about protecting civilian lives. The United States, Great Britain and France have each allied with governments such as Guatemala, Indonesia, Colombia and Zaire which, in recent decades, have engaged in the slaughter of civilians as bad or worse as had been occurring in Libya.

The number of civilian casualties from Gaddafis attacks is difficult to verify but most estimates put the number of civilians killed during the five weeks between the start of the uprising and the Western intervention country at approximately 1,700 people, roughly the same number of civilians killed during Israels 2006 war on Lebanon and its 2008 war on the Gaza Strip combined. Rather than referring those responsible to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or engage in military intervention to stop the slaughter, as has been the case of Libya, both the U.S. Congress and the administration vigorously defended Israels assaults of heavily-populated civilian areas and condemned UN agencies and leading international jurists for documenting Israeli violations of international humanitarian law and for recommending that officials of both Israel and its Arab adversaries suspected of war crimes be referred to the ICC.

Hypocrisy and double-standards regarding military intervention does not automatically mean that military intervention in this case is necessarily wrong. Though many of us familiar with Libya remain dubious, it cannot be ruled out that events could transpire in such a way that this intervention could prove to have saved lives, brought stability, and promoted a democratic transition. However, it would be nave to believe that the attacks on Libya are motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns.

There are also so many factors at play as Asli Bali, professor of International Law at the UCLA School of Law, alludes to:

We have, for the most part, the same coalition of forces that are prepared to intervene in the Libyan case are more or less supporting both the Bahraini and the Yemeni regimes strategies.

In addition, I think that there were considerations in the Libyan case: the isolation of the regime, the fact that it represents a relatively weak military force with very few allies in the region, the fact that it borders on the Mediterranean and gives rise to the possibility of major migration flows to Europe, should there be a long protracted conflict there, and that it sits atop energy sources that would destabilize energy markets. I mean, I think these are all important considerations that, frankly, we have to concede are among the motivations. Thats not to say that any intervention is bad because of mixed motivations; thats not the argument. But one has to be clear-eyed about why it is that this coalition has been willing to proceed in this instance and is not, on the other hand, prepared to intervene, let alone forcefully, in any way, really, politically, with response to the repression that were seeing in Bahrain and Yemen.

Bahrain, close ally to Saudi Arabia, is also home to the US navys fifth fleet, so that may partly explain their silence there. Despite peaceful pro-democratic protests, the crackdown by the authorities has been brutal and theyve even invited Saudi Arabian troops in to contain the protests further.

As The Guardian has noted, In 2003, Bahrain was named by George Bush as a major non-NATO ally. The US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, during a visit to Manama in December, called Bahrain a model partner, not only for the US but other countries in the region. Clinton had added that America will continue working with [Bahrain] to promote a vigorous civil society and to ensure that democracy, human rights and civil liberties are protected by the rule of law.

Reuters recently reported that US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates said Syria, Libya and Iran were examples of authoritarian regimes (that) have suppressed their people and have been willing to use violence against them. It is probably not surprising those 3 were mentioned as they are typically the anti-West ones; the pro-West regimes were not listed by him. Though Gates is not the only Western official to say something like this over the years.

In addition, as Pepe Escobar reveals in the Asia Times, there may be a deal of convenience behind the scenes:

Two diplomatic sources at the United Nations independently confirmed that Washington, via Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, gave the go-ahead for Saudi Arabia to invade Bahrain and crush the pro-democracy movement in their neighbor in exchange for a yes vote by the Arab League for a no-fly zone over Libya the main rationale that led to United Nations Security Council resolution 1973.

Escobar was describing what The Telegraph had reported: Saudi officials say they gave their backing to Western air strikes on Libya in exchange for the United States muting its criticism of the authorities in Bahrain, a close ally of the desert kingdom.

Former British Ambassador, Craig Murray, was the source for the second diplomatic source Escobar referred to and is worth quoting further:

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