Libyan Civil War (2014present) – Wikipedia
Libyan Civil War Part of the Arab Winter, the Libyan Crisis Date 16 May 2014 present (2years, 6months, 3weeks and 3days) Location Libya Status
Ongoing
Council of Deputies (Tobruk-based)[1][2]
Egypt[6][7]United Arab Emirates[6] Chad[8]Supported by:
General National Congress (Tripoli-based)[15]
Sudan[21]Supported by:
Government of National Accord (since 2016)
Supported by:
Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries[32][33]
Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (since 2015)[37]
Abdullah al-Thani (Prime Minister) [61]
General Officer Khalifa Haftar (Commander of Operation Dignity)
Col. Wanis Abu Khamada (Commander of Libyan Special Forces)
Brig. Gen. Saqr Geroushi (Chief of Staff of the Libyan Air Force)
Chief of Staff Abdel Razek Al-Nazuri (Libyan Ground Forces)
Nouri Abusahmain (former) (President of the GNC)
Khalifa al-Ghawi (Prime Minister, not internationally recognized)[62]
Sadiq Al-Ghariani (Grand Mufti)
Salah Badi (Operation Libya Dawn Commander)
Shaaban Hadia (LROR Commander)
Adel Gharyani (LROR Commander)
Col. Al-Mahdi Al-Barghathi (GNA Minister of Defense)
Rida Issa[27] (Libyan Navy commander)
Abu Khalid al Madani (Ansar al-Sharia Leader)[63]
Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Commander of Al-Mourabitoun,believed dead)[64]
Mohamed al-Zahawi[65] (Former Ansar al-Sharia Leader)
Wissam Ben Hamid (Libya Shield 1 Commander)
Salim Derby (Commander of Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade)[66]
Abu Sufian bin Qumu (Ansar al-Sharia commander in Derna)
Abu Nabil al-Anbari (Top ISIL leader in Libya)[67][68] Abu Hudhayfah al-Muhajir[69] (ISIL governor of Wilayat Tripolitania) Mohammed Abdullah (IS Emir of Derna)[37] Ali Al Qarqaa (Emir of Nofaliya)[45] Ahmed Rouissi (Senior IS commander)[70] Abdullah Al-Libi[71]
The second Libyan Civil War[78][79] is an ongoing conflict among rival groups seeking control of the territory of Libya. The conflict has been mostly between the government of the Council of Deputies (CoD) that was elected democratically in 2014, also known as the "Tobruk government" and internationally recognized as the "Libyan Government"; and the rival General National Congress (GNC) endorsed government, also called the "National Salvation Government", based in the capital Tripoli established after Operation Libya Dawn.
In December 2015 the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) [80] was signed. The LPA was the result of protracted negotiations between rival political camps based in the capital, Tripoli, Tobruk and elsewhere which agreed to unite as the Government of National Accord. Although the Government of National Accord is now functioning, its authority is still unclear as specific details acceptable to both sides have not yet been agreed upon.
The CoD also known as the House of Representatives, strongest in eastern Libya, has the loyalty of the Libyan National Army under the command of General Khalifa Haftar and has been supported by air strikes by Egypt and the UAE.[81] The GNC, based in western Libya and backed by "Libya Dawn", Qatar, Sudan and Turkey,[81][82][83][84] initially accepted the results of the 2014 election, but rejected them after the Supreme Constitutional Court nullified an amendment regarding the roadmap for Libya's transition and HoR elections.[13] Due to controversy about constitutional amendments, the HoR refused to take office from GNC in Tripoli,[85] which was controlled by powerful militias from the western coastal city of Misrata. Instead, the HoR established its parliament in Tobruk.
In addition to these, there are also smaller rival groups: the Islamist Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, led by Ansar al-Sharia (Libya), which has had the support of the GNC;[86] the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL's) Libyan provinces;[87] as well as Tuareg militias of Ghat, controlling desert areas in the southwest; and local forces in Misrata District, controlling the towns of Bani Walid and Tawergha. The belligerents are coalitions of armed groups that sometimes change sides.[81]
In recent months there have been many political developments. The United Nations brokered a cease-fire in December 2015, and on 31 March 2016, the leaders of a new UN-supported "unity government" arrived in Tripoli.[49] On 5 April, the rival GNC government announced that it was suspending operations and handing power to the new unity government, officially named the "Government of National Accord", although it was not yet clear whether the new arrangement would succeed.[50] As of 22 August, the unity government still had not received the approval of the House of Representatives with most members of the parliament voting against it in a motion of no confidence.[88][89][90][91]
At the beginning of 2014, Libya was governed by the General National Congress (GNC), which won the popular vote in 2012 elections.The GNC had become the subject of considerable discontent for, among other things. The GNC lost credibility as a result of having overstepped its mandate on the one hand, and accomplished little on the other. The GNC was made of two major political groupings, the National Forces Alliance (NFC) and the Justice and Construction Party (JCP). The two major groups in parliament had failed to reach political compromises on the larger more important issues that the GNC faced.
Division among these parties, the row over the political isolation law, and a continuous unstable security situation greatly impacted the GNC's ability to deliver real progress towards a new constitution for Libya which was a primary task for this body.[92]
The GNC also included members associated with conservative Islamist Groups as well as revolutionary groups (thuwwar). Some members of the GNC had a conflict of interest due to associations with militias and were accused of channeling government funds towards some armed groups and allowing others to conduct assassinations and kidnappings. Parties holding majority of seats and some holding minority of seats began to use boycotts or threats of boycotts which increased division and suppressed relevant debates by removing them from the congressional agenda;[93] voting to declare sharia law and establishing "a special committee" to "review all existing laws to guarantee they comply with Islamic law";[94] imposing gender segregation and compulsory hijab at Libyan universities; and refusing to hold new elections when its electoral mandate expired in January 2014[95] until General Khalifa Haftar launched a large-scale military offensive against the Islamists in May 2014, code-named Operation Dignity (Arabic: ; 'Amaliya al-Karamah).[96][97]
The 2012 elections, overseen by the Libyan electoral commission with the support of the UN Special Mission In Libya (UNSMIL) and nongovernmental organizations like the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), have been considered "fair and free" by most Libyans. However, the elections did not necessarily create a strong government because the Parliament was fragmented due to the lack of organized political parties in Libya post-revolution. The GNC was made up two major parties, the National Forces Alliance and the Justice and Construction Party, as well as independents in which some where moderates and others conservative Islamists. The GNC became a broad-based congress.[92]
The GNA elected Nouri Abusahmain as president of the GNC in June 2013.[98][99] He was considered an independent Islamist and a compromise candidate acceptable to liberal members of the congress, as he was elected with 96 out of a total of 184 votes by the GNC.[100]
The GNC was challenged due to increasing security concerns in Tripoli. The GNC itself was attacked many times from militias and armed protesters who stormed the GNC assembly hall.[101] Following his appointment, Abusahmain was tasked with providing security. He setup the Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) which was initially intended to protect and secure Tripoli in August 2013. But this armed group was responsible for kidnapping Prime Minister Zeidan in October of that year resulting in the GNC dismissing it from its security function and Abusahmain himself as president.[102] During his term, Abusahmain blocked inquiries into the distribution of state funds and it was alleged that Abusahmain was channeling government funding towards the LROR.[100] The LROR was not an Islamist armed group but rather was made of rebels from the city of Gharyan. Its commander was Adel Gharyani.
In October 2013, following the kidnapping of the Prime Minister, Abusahmain used his presidency to change the agenda of the GNC in order to prevent a debate over disestablishing the LROR. At the same time, he cancelled a request to establish a committee to investigate the allocation, by Abusahmain himself, of 900 million Libyan Dinars (US $720 million) to the LROR and various other armed groups.[93] Instead, the LROR had its responsibilities reduced by the GNC but was allowed to continue to operate, and no one was prosecuted for the incident.
The kidnapping of Zeidan was believed to be a coup attempt supported by members of the GNC, who was viewed as too moderate (see: 2013 Libyan coup d'tat attempt).
Most journalists reported that it was the Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room (LROR) (Ghurfat Amaliyat al-Thuwar) created by Abusahmain by decree 143 of 7 July. Yet there is evidence to suggest that this is not the case and that armed groups such as the Duru3 actually conducted the kidnapping.[103]
Many Libyans blamed the GNC and the interim government for a continued lack of security in the country. The interim government struggled to control well-armed militias and armed groups that established during the revolution. Libyans in Benghazi especially began to witness assassinations and kidnapping and perceived the GNC to be turning a blind eye to the deteriorating security situation in the east.
But security concerns increased across the country allowing armed groups to expand in both Tripoli and in the east.
In April 2014, an anti-terrorist training base called "Camp 27", located between Tripoli and the Tunisian border, was taken over by forces fighting under the control of Abd al-Muhsin Al-Libi, also known as Ibrahim Tantoush,[105] a long-serving Al-Qaeda organizer and former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.[106] The Islamist forces at Camp 27 have subsequently been described as part of the Libya Shield Force.[107] The Libya Shield Force was already identified by some observers as linked to al-Qaeda as early as 2012.[108][109]
Although Islamists were outnumbered by Liberals and Centrists in the GNC, in May 2014 they lobbied for a law "banning virtually everyone who had participated in Qaddafi's government from holding public office". While several Islamist political parties and independents supported the law, as they generally had no associations to the Qaddafi regime, the law enjoyed strong public support. Polls demonstrates that a large majority of the Libyan people supported the exclusion of high-ranking Qaddafi-regime officials.[92]
The law particularly impacts elite expatriates and leaders of liberal parties. There existed reservations that such a law would eliminate technocratic expertise needed in Libya at the time.
Armed militiamen stormed government ministries, shut down the GNC itself and demanded the law's passage. This intimidated the GNC into passing the law in which 164 members approved the bill, with only four abstaining and no member opposing it.[92]
GNC opponents argue that it was supporting Islamist actions against women. Sadiq Ghariani, the Grand Mufti of Libya, is perceived to be linked closely to Islamist parties. He has issued fatwas ordering Muslims to obey the GNC,[110] and fatwas ordering Muslims to fight against Haftar's forces[111]
In March 2013, Sadiq Ghariani, the Grand Mufti, issued a fatwa against the UN Report on Violence Against Women and Girls. He condemned the UN report for "advocating immorality and indecency in addition to rebelliousness against religion and clear objections to the laws contained in the Quran and Sunnah".[112][113] Soon after the Grand Mufti issued a clarification op-ed that there should be no discrimination between men and women yet women have a greater role in the family, nevertheless, this does not mean Islam violates the rights of women.[114]
Later in 2013, lawyer Hamida Al-Hadi Al-Asfar, advocate of women's rights, was abducted, tortured and killed. It is alleged she was targeted for criticising the Grand Mufti's declaration.[115] No arrests were made.
In June 2013, two politicians, Ali Tekbali and Fathi Sager, appeared in court for "insulting Islam" for publishing a cartoon promoting women's rights.[116] Under sharia law they were facing a possible death penalty. The case caused widespread concern although they were eventually acquitted in March 2014. After the GNC was forced to accept new elections, Ali Tekbali was elected to the new House of Representatives.
During Nouri Abusahmain's presidency of the GNC and subsequent to GNC's decision to enforce sharia law in December 2013, gender segregation and compulsory hijab were being imposed in Libyan universities from early 2014, provoking strong criticism from Women's Rights groups.
The GNC failed to stand down at the end of its electoral mandate in January 2014, unilaterally voting on 23 December 2013 to extend its power for at least one year. This caused widespread unease and some protests. Residents of the eastern city of Shahat, along with protesters from Bayda and Sousse, staged a large demonstration, rejecting the GNC's extension plan and demanding the resignation of the congress followed by a peaceful power transition to a legitimate body. They also protested the lack of security, blaming the GNC for failing to build the army and police.[96] Other Libyans rejecting the proposed mandate rallied in Tripoli's Martyrs Square and outside Benghazi's Tibesti Hotel, calling for the freeze of political parties and the re-activation of the country's security system.[117]
On 14 February 2014, General Khalifa Haftar ordered the GNC to dissolve and called for the formation of a caretaker government committee to oversee new elections. However his actions had little effect on the GNC, which called his actions "an attempted coup" and called Haftar himself "ridiculous" and labelled him an aspiring dictator. The GNC continued to operate as before. No arrests were made. Haftar launched Operation Dignity two months later, on 16 May.[citation needed]
On 25 May 2014, about one week after Khalifa Haftar started his Operation Dignity offensive against the General National Congress, that body set 25 June 2014 as the date for new elections.[118] Islamists were defeated, but rejected the results of the election, which saw only an 18% turnout.[119][120][121] They accused the new Council of Deputies parliament of being dominated by supporters of the former dictator, and they continued to support the old GNC after the Council officially replaced it on 4 August 2014.[81][122][123]
The conflict escalated on 13 July 2014, when Tripoli's Islamists and Misratan militias launched Operation Libya Dawn to seize Tripoli International Airport, capturing it from the Zintan militia on 23 August. Shortly thereafter, members of the GNC, whom had rejected the June election, reconvened as a new General National Congress and voted themselves as replacement of the newly elected Council of Deputies, with Tripoli as their political capital, Nouri Abusahmain as president and Omar al-Hasi as prime minister. As a consequence, the majority of the Council of Deputies was forced to relocate to Tobruk, aligning itself with Haftar's forces and eventually nominating him army chief.[124] On 6 November, the supreme court in Tripoli, dominated by the new GNC, declared the Council of Deputies dissolved.[125][126][127] The Council of Deputies rejected this ruling as made "under threat".[128]
On 16 January 2015, the Operation Dignity and Operation Libya Dawn factions agreed on a ceasefire.[47] The country was then led by two separate governments, with Tripoli and Misrata controlled by forces loyal to Libya Dawn and the new GNC in Tripoli, while the international community recognized Abdullah al-Thani's government and its parliament in Tobruk.[129] Benghazi remained contested between pro-Haftar forces and radical Islamists.[130]
The Islamist "Libyan Dawn" has been described as "an uneasy coalition" including "former al-Qaeda jihadists" who fought against Qaddafi in the nineties, Berber ethnic militias, members of Libya's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and a "network of conservative merchants" from Misrata, whose fighters make up "the largest block of Libya Dawn's forces".[131] The Islamist forces are identified as "terrorists" by the elected parliament in Tobruk.[132] The city of Zawia and its associated brigades have been waging operations in western Libya in support of the Libya Dawn coalition. The motivations of the Zawia brigades participation in the war have been described as unrelated to religion and instead deriving foremost from tribal conflict with the Warshafana and secondarily as a result of opposition to the Zintani brigades and General Haftar.[133]
The Libya Shield Force supports the Islamists. Its forces are divided geographically into the Western Shield, Central Shield and Eastern Shield. Elements of the Libya Shield Force were identified by some observers as linked to Al-Qaeda as early as 2012.[108][109] The term "Libya Shield 1" is used to refer to the Islamist part of the Libya Shield Force in the east of Libya.[134]
In Eastern Libya, Islamist armed groups have organized themselves into the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. These are:
In western Libya, the prominent Islamist forces are the Central Shield (of the Libya Shield Force), which consists especially of Misrata units, and the Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room. Two smaller organizations operating in western Libya are Ignewa Al-Kikly and the "Lions of Monotheism".
Al-Qaeda leader Abd al-Muhsin Al-Libi, also known as Ibrahim Ali Abu Bakr or Ibrahim Tantoush[106] has been active in western Libya, capturing the special forces base called Camp 27 in April 2014 and losing it to anti-Islamist forces in August 2014.[105] The Islamist forces around Camp 27 have been described as both Al-Qaida[105] and as part of the Libya Shield Force.[107] The relationship between Al-Qaeda and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is unclear, and their relationship with other Libyan Islamist groups is unclear. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb are also active in Fezzan, especially in border areas.
The Zawia[disambiguation needed] tribe has been allied to Libya Dawn since August 2014[135] although in June 2014 at least one Zawia army unit had appeared to side with General Haftar, and reports in December claimed Zawia forces were openly considering breaking away from Libya Dawn.[136] Zawia militia have been heavily fighting the Warshefana tribe. In the current conflict, the Warshefana have been strongly identified with the forces fighting against both Libya Dawn and Al Qaeda. Zawia has been involved in a long-standing tribal conflict with the neighbouring Warshefana tribe since 2011.[137]
The anti-Islamist forces are built around Haftar's faction of the Libyan National Army, including land, sea and air forces.
Since the Battle of Tripoli Airport, armed groups associated with Zintan and the surrounding Nafusa region have become prominent. The Airport Security Battalion is recruited in large part from Zintan.
The "Zintan Brigades" fall under the leadership of the Zintan Revolutionaries' Military Council. They consist of:
The Airport Security Battalion at Tripoli Airport was linked to the Zintan Brigades.
Warshefana tribal armed groups, from the area immediately south and west of Tripoli, have been playing a growing role in the anti-Islamist forces. On 5 August, they were reported to have recaptured Camp 27, a training base west of Tripoli. But it had been captured by forces under Al-Qaeda organizer Ibrahim Ali Abu Bakr Tantoush in April 2014. Warshefana armed groups have also been involved in a long-standing tribal conflict with the neighbouring Zawia city since 2011.[137] Zawia has been allied to Libya Dawn since August 2014[135] although its commitment to Libya Dawn is reportedly wavering.[136]
A minority portion of the Libya Shield Force is reported to have not joined the Islamist forces. It is not clear if this means they have joined the anti-Islamist forces. Although journalists have referred to this group as "Libya Shield 2"[138] to distinguish it from the Islamist faction which calls itself Libya Shield 1, it is not clear that this name is commonly used.
On 19 May 2014, a number of Libyan military officers announced their support for Gen. Haftar, including officers in an air force base in Tobruk, and others who have occupied a significant portion of the country's oil infrastructure, as well as members of an important militia group in Benghazi. On the other hand, several fighters from Misrata moved to Tripoli to counter Haftar's offensive, but this happened after the general managed to gather allies from Bayda, 125 miles east of Benghazi.[139]
Additional supporters of the movement include Libya's former Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, ousted by General National Congress (GNC) Islamist parties, and Libya's ambassador to the United Nations who had announced his backing of Haftar's offensive against Islamist lawmakers and extremist militias, just hours after the country's air force commander had made a similar move, further building support for a campaign. The current Prime Minister has described Operation Dignity as a coup d'tat.[3][140] The commander of the army's special forces also said he had allied with Haftar.[4] However, the show of support for the general appears to have triggered a heavy backlash, as Libya's navy chief Brig. Gen. Hassan Abu-Shanaq, who also announced his support for Haftar's revolt, was wounded in an assassination attempt in the capital Tripoli along with his driver and a guard. On 20 May, the air forces headquarters in Tripoli came under a rocket attack but no casualties were reported.[3][141]
On 21 May, the uprising was described by the Washington Post as the most serious challenge to the Libyan authorities since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.[139]
The Islamist forces have attempted to secure some support by focusing on a tribal theme, arguing that the elected government is not adequately opposed to the idea of military units led by Zintanis.[142] As a Berber/Amazigh, Nouri Abusahmain's prominence has also secured the Islamists some Berber/Amazigh support. One unnamed pro-Dawn Amazigh commander has apparently claimed "The majority of Dawn are not Islamist..." and "We all have different reasons for wanting less Zintani influence in western Libya."[142]
In the Benghazi region, a salafist group calling itself "the Awakening" (sahwa), the "Islamic Awakening", or "the Awakening of Islam", co-operates with the Tobruk government specifically in the conflict against the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. It is not clear what stance the group would take between the Tobruk government and Libya Dawn. The Awakening group appears to be a proxy of the Saudi Islamic Awakening movement, which is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the largest group in the Libya Dawn government.
As of February 2015, damage and disorder from the war has been considerable.[143] There are frequent electric outages, little business activity, and a loss in revenues from oil by 90%.[143] Over 4,000 people have died from the fighting,[77] and some sources claim nearly a third of the country's population has fled to Tunisia as refugees.[143]
During the first half of 2015, the United Nations facilitated a series of different negotiating tracks seeking to bring together the rival governments of Libya and warring militias tearing Libya apart.[144] The U.N. representative to Libya reconvened delegations from Libya's rival governments on 8 June 2015 to present the latest draft proposal for a unity government for the war-torn country.[144] After a warning one week earlier that the country had been running out of money and had risked ceasing to be a functional state, Bernardino Leon urged the Libyans to approve the fourth version of the draft proposal in a ceremony in Morocco.[144] On 8 October 2015, Bernardino Leon held a press conference in which the names of several potential members of a unified government were announced.[145]
A meeting between the rival governments was held at Auberge de Castille in Valletta, Malta on 16 December 2015. The meeting was delayed for a few days after the representatives from the Tobruk government initially failed to show up.[146] The leader of the Tripoli government, Nouri Abusahmain, announced that they "will not accept foreign intervention against the will of the Libyan people," while the leader of the Tobruk government Aguila Saleh Issa called on the international community to "allow [them] time to form an effective unity government." Representatives from both governments also met officials from the United Nations, Italy, the United States and Russia in a conference in Rome.[147]
On 17 December, delegates from both rival governments signed a peace deal backed by the UN in Skhirat, Morocco, although there was opposition to this within both factions.[1][2] The Government of National Accord was formed as a result of this agreement, and its first meeting took place in Tunis on 2 January 2016.[148]
Haftar and his supporters describe Operation Dignity as a "correction to the path of the revolution" and a "war on terrorism".[149][150][151] The elected parliament has declared that Haftar's enemies are "terrorists", .[132] Opponents of Haftar and the coup d'tat government in Tripoli claim he is attempting a coup. Omar al-Hasi, the internationally unrecognized Prime Minister of the Libya Dawn-backed Tripoli government, speaking of his allies' actions, has stated that: "This is a correction of the revolution." He has also contended: "Our revolution had fallen into a trap."[152] Dawn commanders claim to be fighting for a "revolutionary" cause rather than for religious or partisan objectives.[153] Islamist militia group Ansar al-Sharia (linked to the 2012 Benghazi attack) has denounced Haftar's campaign as a Western-backed "war on Islam"[154] and has declared the establishment of the "Islamic Emirate of Benghazi".
Early in May 2014, the Algerian military said it was engaged in an operation aimed at tracking down militants who infiltrated the country's territory in Tamanrasset near the Libyan border, during which it announced that it managed to kill 10 "terrorists" and seized a large cache of weapons near the town of Janet consisting of automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and ammunition boxes.[155]The Times reported on 30 May that Algerian forces were strongly present in Libya and it was claimed shortly after by an Algerian journalist from El Watan that a full regiment of 3,500 paratroopers logistically supported by 1,500 other men crossed into Libya and occupied a zone in the west of the country. They were later shown to be operating alongside French special forces in the region. However, all of these claims were later denied by the Algerian government through Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal who told the senate that "Algeria has always shown its willingness to assist [our] sister countries, but things are clear: the Algerian army will not undertake any operation outside Algerian territory".[156]
On 16 May 2014, the Algerian government responded to a threat on its embassy in Libya by sending a team of special forces to Tripoli to escort its diplomatic staff in a military plane out of the country. "Due to a real and imminent threat targeting our diplomats the decision was taken in coordination with Libyan authorities to urgently close our embassy and consulate general temporarily in Tripoli," the Algerian Foreign Ministry said in a statement.[157] Three days later, the Algerian government shut down all of its border crossings with Libya and the army command raised its security alert status by tightening its presence along the border, especially on the Tinalkoum and Debdab border crossings. This also came as the state-owned energy firm, Sonatrach, evacuated all of its workers from Libya and halted production in the country.[158] In mid-August, Algeria opened its border for Egyptian refugees stranded in Libya and said it would grant them exceptional visas to facilitate their return to Egypt.[159]
Egyptian authorities have long expressed concern over the instability in eastern Libya spilling over into Egypt due to the rise of jihadist movements in the region, which the government believes to have developed into a safe transit for wanted Islamists following the 2013 coup d'tat in Egypt that ousted Muslim Brotherhood-backed president Mohamed Morsi. There have been numerous attacks on Egypt's trade interests in Libya which were rampant prior to Haftar's offensive, especially with the kidnapping of truck drivers and sometimes workers were murdered.[160] Due to this, the military-backed government in Egypt had many reasons to support Haftar's rebellion and the Islamist February 17th Martyrs Brigade operating in Libya has accused the Egyptian government of supplying Haftar with weapons and ammunition, a claim denied by both Cairo and the rebel leader.[161] Furthermore, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who has become increasingly popular among many Libyans wishing for stability,[162] has called on the United States to intervene militarily in Libya during his presidential candidacy, warning that Libya was becoming a major security challenge and vowed not to allow the turmoil there to threaten Egypt's national security.[163]
On 21 July, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry urged its nationals residing in Libya to adopt measures of extreme caution as it was preparing to send consular staff in order to facilitate their return their country following an attack in Egypt's western desert region near the border with Libya that left 22 Egyptian border guards killed.[164] A week later, the ministry announced that it would double its diplomatic officials on the Libyan-Tunisian border and reiterated its call on Egyptian nationals to find shelter in safer places in Libya.[165] On 3 August, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia agreed to cooperate by establishing an airbridge between Cairo and Tunis that would facilitate the transfer of 2,000 to 2,500 Egyptians from Libya daily.[166]
On 31 July, two Egyptians were shot dead during a clash at the Libyan-Tunisian border where hundreds of Egyptians were staging a protest at the Ras Jdeir border crossing. As they tried to cross into Tunisia, Libyan authorities opened fire to disperse them.[167] A similar incident occurred once again on 15 August, when Libyan security forces shot dead an Egyptian who attempted to force his way through the border along with hundreds of stranded Egyptians and almost 1,200 Egyptians made it into Tunisia that day.[159] This came a few days after Egypt's Minister of Civil Aviation, Hossam Kamal, announced that the emergency airlift consisting of 46 flights aimed at evacuating the country's nationals from Libya came to a conclusion, adding that 11,500 Egyptians in total had returned from the war-torn country as of 9 August.[168] A week later, all Egyptians on the Libyan-Tunisian border were evacuated and the consulate's staff, who were reassigned to work at the border area, withdrew from Libya following the operation's success.[169] Meanwhile, an estimated 50,000 Egyptians (4,000 per day) arrived at the Salloum border crossing on the Libyan-Egyptian border as of early August.[170]
Along with most of the international community, Malta continues to recognize the Council of Deputies as the legitimate government of Libya. Libyan charg d'affaires Hussin Musrati insisted that by doing so, Malta was "interfering in Libyan affairs".[171] Due to the conflict, there are currently two Libyan embassies in Malta. The unrecognized General National Congress now controls the official Libyan Embassy in Balzan, while the internationally recognized Council of Deputies has opened a consulate in Ta' Xbiex. Each of the two embassies say that visas issued by the other entity are not valid.[172]
Following the expansion of ISIL in Libya, particularly the fall of Nawfaliya, the Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat and Leader of the Opposition Simon Busuttil called for the United Nations and European Union to intervene in Libya to prevent the country from becoming a failed state.[173][174]
Post-revolutionary Tunisia also had its share of instability due to the violence in Libya as it witnessed an unprecedented rise in radical Islamism with increased militant activity and weapons' smuggling through the border.[175]
In response to the initial clashes in May, the Tunisian National Council for Security held an emergency meeting and decided to deploy 5,000 soldiers to the LibyanTunisian border in anticipation of potential consequences from the fighting.[176] On 30 July, Tunisian Foreign Minister Mongi Hamdi said that the country cannot cope with the high number of refugees coming from Libya due to the renewed fighting. "Our country's economic situation is precarious, and we cannot cope with hundreds of thousands of refugees," Hamdi said in a statement. He also added that Tunisia will close its borders if necessary.[177]
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Libyan Civil War (2014present) - Wikipedia
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- Security Council: International calls to unify institutions and support the roadmap and elections in Libya - libyaupdate.com - October 17th, 2025 [October 17th, 2025]
- Sarkozy informed of when and where to report to prison for Libya campaign finance scheme - Santa Fe New Mexican - October 17th, 2025 [October 17th, 2025]
- Libyan Navy denies Coast Guard fired on immigrants, accuses European NGOs of politicizing issue - The Libya Observer - October 17th, 2025 [October 17th, 2025]
- Albania Emerges as Destination Port for Illicit Oil from Russia and Libya - Balkan Insight - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- Libya central bank says it has authorised the printing of dinars worth $11 billion - Reuters - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- From Recovery to Renaissance: Libya Reclaims Its Role in Global Energy Markets - Energy Capital & Power - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- NGO Highlights the Violence of Libya's Militia-Operated Coast Guard - The Maritime Executive - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- HRW urges Italy to revoke its migrant cooperation agreement with Libya - Jurist.org - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- Sarkozy informed of when and where to report to prison for Libya campaign finance scheme - 5 EYEWITNESS NEWS - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- Security Council Briefing On Situation In Libya - Mirage News - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- Sarkozy informed of when and where to report to prison for Libya campaign finance scheme - AP News - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- Economic Conference on Diversifying Sources of Income held in Tripoli - Libya Herald - October 15th, 2025 [October 15th, 2025]
- Diplomats Killed, Protests and Peacekeepers Wounded Across Middle East Region As Libya Recovers Bodies of Migrants - ShiaWaves - October 13th, 2025 [October 13th, 2025]
- 61 bodies of migrants recovered in west of Libya's Tripoli - The New Arab - October 13th, 2025 [October 13th, 2025]
- 'MENA ARIN' Network Officially Launches: Libya Calls for Unifying Efforts and Activating the United Nations Convention against Corruption -... - October 13th, 2025 [October 13th, 2025]
- Why Inter and Atletico Madrid played mid-season friendly in Libya - Football Italia - October 13th, 2025 [October 13th, 2025]
- Khoury meets with the Russian ambassador to discuss political and security developments in Libya - libyaupdate.com - October 13th, 2025 [October 13th, 2025]
- 61 bodies of illegals recovered west of Libya's Tripoli - Baird Maritime - October 13th, 2025 [October 13th, 2025]
- Atltico Madrid Edges Inter Milan in Thrilling Friendly Shootout in Libya to Win Inaugural Reconstruction Cup - BBN Times - October 11th, 2025 [October 11th, 2025]
- Why Atletico Madrid and Inter are playing a friendly in Libya after Barcelona pulled out - The New York Times - October 11th, 2025 [October 11th, 2025]
- The most controversial fixture in football. Plus: A European friendly in Libya - The Athletic - The New York Times - October 11th, 2025 [October 11th, 2025]
- Revealed: How Much Inter Milan & Atletico Madrid Will Earn From Libya Friendly In Benghazi - SempreInter.com - October 11th, 2025 [October 11th, 2025]
- Libya Karama Party organizes a session on womens health and breast cancer - libyaupdate.com - October 11th, 2025 [October 11th, 2025]
- Goals and Highlights: Libya 3-3 Cape Verde in African Qualifiers for the 2026 World Cup - VAVEL.com - October 9th, 2025 [October 9th, 2025]
- Eni re-enters Libya exploration well five years after drilling suspended - Upstream Online - October 9th, 2025 [October 9th, 2025]
- Al-Marash: Changing the government and addressing the security file is the key to breaking the deadlock in Libya - libyaupdate.com - October 9th, 2025 [October 9th, 2025]
- CBL announces that first Absolute Speculative Certificates of Deposit will be issued to banks from 12 October - Libya Herald - October 9th, 2025 [October 9th, 2025]
- "Decision-Making and Implementation Meeting: A Direct Dialogue between the Central Bank of Libya and the Private Sector" workshop to be held... - October 9th, 2025 [October 9th, 2025]
- Libya revives offshore oil exploration after five-year hiatus - The North Africa Post - October 9th, 2025 [October 9th, 2025]
- Italy's Eni resumes drilling in offshore area northwest of Libya after five year hiatus - Reuters - October 7th, 2025 [October 7th, 2025]
- Haftar pledges new chapter for Libya, vows to end division - The Arab Weekly - October 7th, 2025 [October 7th, 2025]
- Libya at decisive turning point - The Arab Weekly - October 7th, 2025 [October 7th, 2025]
- The British Telegraph: Western Libya is militia chaos and Benghazi is heading toward a new era with infrastructure and urban expansion -... - October 7th, 2025 [October 7th, 2025]
- Administrative Control Authority discusses cooperation with Turkey - The Libya Observer - October 7th, 2025 [October 7th, 2025]
- Eni resumes drilling in offshore area northwest of Libya - TradeArabia - October 7th, 2025 [October 7th, 2025]
- US, Italy, and Turkey alignment could push the needle in Libya - Atlantic Council - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- ICJ Statement on Serious Human Rights Violations in Libya - The International Commission of Jurists - ICJ - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Tough Efforts to Unify the Libyan Military Institution: Can Al-Menfi Overcome the Division? - The Libya Observer - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Inter Milan & Atletico Madrid To Play Reconstruction Cup Friendly In Libya During International Break - Yahoo - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Libya welcomes US ceasefire initiative for Gaza - The Libya Observer - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Italy-Libya migration pact under scrutiny as bullets fly - Northeast Mississippi Daily Journal - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Libyas army chief calls for stronger Mediterranean cooperation against terrorism and trafficking - The Libya Observer - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Libya introduces new health requirements for workers wishing to enter the country - The Libya Observer - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Hannibal Gaddafi hospitalised in Beirut after health deterioration - The Libya Observer - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Bangladesh considers opening a consulate in Benghazi - The Libya Observer - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Libyan Industry Union signs MoU with Maghreb Bank for Investment and Foreign Trade BMICE to expand financing opportunities for Libyan industry - Libya... - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- Peste des Petits Ruminants threatens Libya's livestock wealth... and a warning of an "insufficient" response - libyaupdate.com - October 4th, 2025 [October 4th, 2025]
- TAY OIL Services and Polaris commission a pioneering onshore seismic survey for AGOCO in Libya - Oilfield Technology - October 2nd, 2025 [October 2nd, 2025]
- Libyan FinTech NGO, FinOria, is organising a Hackathon from 15 to 17 November - Libya Herald - October 2nd, 2025 [October 2nd, 2025]
- The Ministry of Health and the World Bank meet to enhance cooperation on health projects and service development - Libya Herald - October 2nd, 2025 [October 2nd, 2025]
- NGO footage shows overcrowded dinghy and migrants in water off Libya - Yahoo News Canada - October 2nd, 2025 [October 2nd, 2025]
- Progress made in drafting a law on missing persons in Libya with UN support - libyaupdate.com - October 2nd, 2025 [October 2nd, 2025]
- The Political Fallout of European Migration Policy in Libya - Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) - September 30th, 2025 [September 30th, 2025]
- Libya - Welcome to the United Nations - September 30th, 2025 [September 30th, 2025]
- NGO footage shows overcrowded dinghy and migrants in water off Libya - Yahoo - September 30th, 2025 [September 30th, 2025]
- NGO footage shows overcrowded dinghy and migrants in water off Libya - AP News - September 30th, 2025 [September 30th, 2025]
- World Banks new Tripoli headquarters inspected in anticipation of the resumption of its work from Libya - Libya Herald - September 30th, 2025 [September 30th, 2025]
- 71 commercial vessels were received by the Julyana Free Zone Port in August - Libya Herald - September 30th, 2025 [September 30th, 2025]
- Over 1,000 Migrants Intercepted and Returned to Libya in One Week, IOM Reports - libyaupdate.com - September 30th, 2025 [September 30th, 2025]
- French ex-president Sarkozy sentenced to 5 years in prison in Libya campaign financing case - France 24 - September 28th, 2025 [September 28th, 2025]
- Libya's heroes win medals in the championship, and Ben Hamid dedicates the gold to his country - libyaupdate.com - September 28th, 2025 [September 28th, 2025]
- Former French President Sarkozy sentenced to 5 years over Libya campaign financing - Courthouse News - September 28th, 2025 [September 28th, 2025]
- Libyas PPP Company participates in the Libyan French Economic Forum held in southern France - Libya Herald - September 28th, 2025 [September 28th, 2025]
- 1,016 Libya-wide investment projects boost the economy by 101 billion dinars - Libya Herald - September 28th, 2025 [September 28th, 2025]
- Nicolas Sarkozy sentenced to five years in Libya campaign financing case - BBC - September 25th, 2025 [September 25th, 2025]
- Is Turkey Pulling a Seabed Heist with Libya? Malta Sounds the Alarm - Middle East Forum - September 25th, 2025 [September 25th, 2025]
- Ex-French President Sarkozy Gets 5 Years in Prison in Libya Corruption Case - Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project | OCCRP - September 25th, 2025 [September 25th, 2025]