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A decade after the overthrow of longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi, Libya is set to hold elections this December to produce a unified government. As the date approaches, the countrys Maghreb neighbors Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are showing intensified interest in its ongoing peace process.

Algerian decisionmakers resumed Libya flights, opened a sea line between Algiers and Tripoli, and recently appointed Ramtane Lamamra who has been highly engaged in the Libya dossier as foreign minister. Tunisia remains most interested in controlling security risks and reestablishing economic ties and has signed agreements with Libya over the summer to promote mutual trade, investment, and movement of travelers. Morocco, the birthplace of the 2015 Skhirat agreement (which recognized the Government of National Unity as Libyas sole legitimate authority), is organizing meetings between rival Libyan actors and bilateral talks with officials on potential cooperation in the fields of enhanced security, trade, and renewable energy.

Despite a problematic lack of coordination on the Libya dossier between these states, all putatively agree that elections are the best way forward for the conflict-stricken country. Furthermore, they have all consistently supported inter-Libyan dialogue that promotes Libya voices. Yet their heightened interest over recent months raises questions. Why have they become increasingly invested in Libya, and what do they stand to gain from its stability?

TheprimaryreasonbehindMaghreb interest in Libyas stability is the security threatwhichcontinued chaos represents.As political instability piqued in Libya following 2011, itled to increased terrorism, organized crime, weapons proliferation, and drug trafficking.This is especially problematic forAlgeria and Tunisia,whichshare porous land borderswith Libya.The Tunisian government hassignificantly increasedsecurityspendingsince the collapse of the Libyan security sector, while the Algerian regime increased the number of troops along its shared border.Even Morocco, which is not a direct neighbor, has been impacted by instability in Libya, particularly in terms of the threat of terrorism. As Moroccan fighters joined theIslamic Stategroupsbranch in Libya from where the terrorist organization planned to launch attacks on Europe their imminent return created risks for the kingdoms security.

Furthermore, because of the power vacuum in Tripoli, the possibility of terrorist organizations and rebel groups launching their offensives from Libya was a real threat for the entire North Africa region, asevidencedwhen aChadian military-political rebel grouplaunched a battle that killed President IdrisDbyItno. The collapse of Libyas security sector has also made it possible forweapons smuggling, drug trafficking, and other criminal activity to take place at an intensified level. While prior to 2011 Libya saw little trafficking in drugs other than cannabis, it is now awell-established routeforcocaine, heroin, and amphetamines.

This could explain why certain Maghreb states have signaled the possibility of military partnership with Libyas Government of National Unity.The president ofAlgeria, ahistorically isolationistcountry,claimedthat he was ready to enforce red lines against Field Marshal KhalifaHifter. Furthermore, a2020reform of the countrys constitution made it possible for the Algerian army to deploy overseas, a change from a decades-old non-interventionist military policy. Morocco and Libya meanwhile are in advanced talks on enhanced cooperation on terrorism and migration and aim to enter into a military partnership.It is true that the aforementioned Algerian constitutional reform is likely also due to the rising instability in theSahel region and that the Morocco talks are possibly another way for the kingdom to maintain its involvement in the Libya dossier and promote its interests. However, these developments suggest that the two countries are taking steps to ensure they would be able to protect themselves from a security threat emanating from Libya or to intervene to deescalate such a situation.

Tunisia is perhaps the Maghreb state that stands to gain the most from reinstating strong economic ties with Libya.Since2011, its economy has been impacted byemigration of Libyans to Tunisiaas well asthe return of Tunisian workers fromthe country. The security threat also contributed to reduced tourism and investment as well as increased security spending.The World Bankestimated that, between 2011 and 2015, the Libyan crisis reduced Tunisias growth by 24%.

Stability in Libya would gradually reverse these effects and would open the door for bilateral economic cooperation.Increasedtourism and tradewould boost Tunisias fragile andCOVID-19-hit economy. The recently opened borders have already allowed Tunisianmerchantsin impoverished areas to travel to Libya and sell their merchandise.Both sides aim to boost cooperation in trade, investment, and tourism down the line as was seen during a Libyan-Tunisian economicforumheld in Libya last May.

Morocco, which did not enjoy strong economic ties with Libya under the Gadhafi regime, could also benefit from new trade and energy deals. Moroccan decisionmakers are working towards this. The kingdoms foreign minister announcedin Junethe organization of a secondbilateral economic forum. That same month, Libyasminister ofoilandgasdiscussed ongoing talks about renewable energy cooperation with Morocco.

To a lesser extent,Algerian officials have also recently shown that they are open to improving trade with Libya and reopening the shard land border which could turn into a major economic zone. Like Tunisia and Morocco, Algeria also organized an economic forumwith Libya and signed anagreementon trade exchange and industrial forums.Algiers has also providedeconomic assistance to communities in southwest Libya, including food aid in 2014 during the tribal conflict between the Tebu and Tuareg tribes.

A potential benefit from peace in Libya on the regional level could be bolsteredintra-regional economic integration in the Maghreb. Trade between Maghreb states stood at 2.8% in 2019, compared to 10.7% between the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Reasons include the crisis in Libya as well as logistical constraints and tensions between Algeria and Morocco. Peace in Libya could present a small possibility for improvement and could make it possible for these states to consolidate economic integration and start initiatives for cross-border security cooperation.

Beyond their domestic interests, some Maghreb states are invested in the Libyan peace process in and of itself to bolster their position on the regional and international stages. Since hosting the meetings which resulted in the signing of the Skhirat agreement, Morocco has organized multiple talks on the issue of key institutional positions, as recently as this summer. Moroccan decisionmakers attach great importance to the kingdoms role in the Libyan peace process, which Rabat views as a way to bolster its international reputation as a credible mediator. This could explain why Moroccan officials were slighted by their exclusionfrom the 2018 Berlin Conference (to which Algeria and Tunisia were eventually invited) and why the kingdom was subsequently relatively absent on theLibyadossier between 2018 and 2020.

By intensifying its involvement in Libya, Morocco also seeks tocheck rival Algerias influence in the region. As Algeria recentlycame to agreements with Tunisia, Egypt,and Turkey on the crisisin Tripoli suggesting intensified interest in Algiers on the dossierMorocco may come to fear that its influenceon Libyaand the region may diminish. This would in turn exacerbate its tensions with Algeria and push it to become even more involved in Libya.

Libyas peace process will remain a complicated one. Evenifelections take place this December,the vote goes smoothly, and it results in a unified government whichHifterdoes not contest, the road ahead will still be long. It may take years for Libyas neighbors to reap economic and security benefits.

Yet, in this scenario, the regional security threat would diminish in the near future which would ease pressure across the board. The Tunisian government could reduce security spending, while Algeria and Morocco could refocus their security efforts on the Sahel region. Foreign investment in the Maghreb would also eventually pick up in the medium to long term, as could tourism (depending on the epidemiological situation).

In the meantime, Maghreb countries will continue to pursue their individual interests through their ties with Libya. The government in Tunisia will likely seek to sign further agreements relating to commerce and tourism while keeping its eye on potential energy deals down the line. Algeria will remain most concerned with the potential security threat that could come out of Libya should the peace process fail, though it is unlikely to intervene militarily beyond securing their shared border. Morocco will aim to assert its role as mediator while preserving the Skhirat institutions. To this end, it will most likely hold moreBouznika-style meetings between rival actors. However, a unified Maghreb response to the Libyan crisis is highly unlikelyaslong astensions and ideological differences persist.

Link:
Libyas peace process: Whats at stake for the Maghreb, 10 years after Gadhafis overthrow - Brookings Institution