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More than six years have passed since the so-called Minsk II accords brought an end to the last high-intensity military conflict in Ukraine. But it would be unduly complacent to suppose that this hiatus will last much longer.

Since the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreement [of 5 September 2014] was signed by the representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE and the unrecognised leaders of the two self-proclaimed Donbas republics on 12 February 2015, more Ukrainian servicemen have been killed in the ensuing low-intensity conflict than in the time since the conflict in southern and eastern Ukraine began.1

Yet this fact has not discouraged many in the West from treating the precarious post-Minsk conditions as a new status quo, when in fact Minsk produced nothing more than a highly contested and continuously flouted armistice. Despite numerous rounds of subsequent negotiation, two at summit level, the gap in perspective about what the accords stipulate and what obligations they entail has not been narrowed one iota.

Alongside the belief in the emergence of a status quo, a second belief has taken root: that Russia is content with this status quo and simply seeks its ratification. This belief rests on two sound assumptions and two erroneous ones.

The first sound assumption is that so long Russia controls these separate areas [otdelniye rayoniy], as well as the interstate border, Ukraine will not be able to reassert its control without its consent. The second is that, so long as this is the case, NATO membership for Ukraine is off the table.

But the first erroneous assumption is that these achievements define the limit of Russias objectives. To the contrary, even in Yeltsins time, Russias primary goal, in former President Dmitry Medvedevs words, was to synchronise the development of the two states, a goal pursued by hard diplomacy and soft coercion until 2014 and by hybrid war ever since.

By Moscows lights, the Minsk accords guarantee the republics a place in Ukraines structures of power and a de facto veto over its fundamental course. This is an outcome that Ukraine refuses to accept. So far, its Normandy partners, France and Germany, refuse to accept it either, and this is no less true for the United States. Thus for Russia, the armistice is becoming an increasingly exasperating obstacle to the achievement of its objectives. That discrepancy exposes the hollowness of the second assumption: that so long as diplomacy and dialogue take place, conflict will not resume. Yet diplomatic stagnation and the freezing of conflict are not synonymous.

Despite much euphoria elsewhere, within weeks of Volodymr Zelenskys election in April 2019, the Kremlin concluded that he was weak, that his administration was conflicted and that he could be induced to advance Russias overall objectives.

Almost from the start, the contrast between Zelenskys conciliatory approach and Petro Poroshenkos obduracy was all too apparent. To the discomfort of the professionals in Ukraines Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Armed Forces, Zelenskys Chief of Staff, Andrii Yermak an individual with no diplomatic or military credentials became the custodian of back channels to Moscow. Indeed, the full and comprehensive cease-fire established on 22 July 2020, on terms that Ukraines military found incapacitating and unworkable, only reconfirmed Zelenskys cooperativeness.2

Yet for whatever combination of reasons, Zelensky appears to have changed his attitude, and this might be true for Germany and France as well. It is now known that on the eve of the December 2019 summit, the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) prepared five scenarios for overcoming the Minsk impasse. Although the scenarios remain unpublished, they possibly contributed to Zelenskys visible self-confidence at the summit.

Much more recently, in January 2021, Viktor Medvedchuks successor on the Trilateral Contact Group, former president Leonid Kravchuk, announced that the formers role in facilitating the release of Ukrainian hostages would be terminated. This was a bold step. For months, and with Russias backing, Medvedchuk had presented Zelensky with a Hobsons choice: either accept prisoner exchanges under his auspices and to his political benefit or halt the process, to the detriment of Zelenskys humanitarian objectives as well as his popularity.

Moreover, these steps were but the beginning of Medvedchuks woes. Since former President Leonid Kuchma reluctantly appointed him Head of the Presidential Administration in 2002, his place in the Ukrainian political system has been analogous to that of an aneurysm in the brain: dangerous to keep in place and potentially life-threatening to remove. Ukraine is at war with Russia de facto, yet Vladimir Putin is godfather to Medvedchuks daughter.

On 17 March 2014 Medvedchuk was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department for his role in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine; Canada sanctioned him the same day.3Nevertheless, three months later President Poroshenko appointed him alongside Kuchma as Ukraines representative on the newly established Trilateral Contact Group.

On 19 February, the NSDC did the unthinkable. It sanctioned all property and assets owned by Medvedchuk and his wife for financing terrorism (i.e. the insurgency), following a decree by Zelensky banning broadcasts by the three pro-Russian television channels owned by his ally, Taras Kozak.4 For the Kremlin, even leaving aside the personal factor, this is a major blow, as Medvedchuk, his party and his media holdings had become its principal instrument for changing Ukraines course. In response, Putins spokesman, Dmitriy Peskov opined that Ukraine might now be considering a military solution to the conflict.5

The third new dynamic is an apparent tilt towards Ukraine by its two Normandy partners, Germany and France. Merkel had signalled the first move in this direction when she apparently backed Zelenskys demand to alter several key political provisions of the Minsk accords during the December 2019 summit. On 4 March, Yermak announced a new joint Franco-German and Ukrainian roadmap for Minsk, thereby also defying Russias insistence that the Minsk accords be implemented as written.

The fourth new dynamic, and hardly the least important, is the advent of the Biden administration. In his State Department speech on 4 February, Bidens clear message to Russia was the days of rolling over in the face of Russias actions are over. Just how much substance he can give to this assertion at a time Washingtons eyes are fixed on China is a question that Russians doubtless are asking themselves.

The conclusion of Russias military establishment is well summarised by Pavel Felgengauer: The West is waging hybrid war against Russia on many fronts: in Belarus, in Ukraine, with respect to Alexei Navalny. And Russia must not sit defensively, but actively counter-attack.6

Since the signing of Minsk-II, several war scares have erupted, none of them plausible and none of which bore fruit. The latest brandishing of sabres is different. Russia is losing the political initiative, yet it retains formidable military power. The combination of political necessity and military opportunity is never auspicious.

Since January, several warning indicators have appeared. But of what?

Given these factors, what is least and most likely to happen?

Of all possible scenarios, the annexation of Donbas is the least likely. Were it to take place, the Minsk accords, very much weighted in Russias favour, would fall to the ground. So would any prospect of reintegrating the republics into Ukraine on Russias terms. Russia would thereby lose its most direct means of influencing Ukraines future trajectory. Doubtless for these reasons, Peskov immediately and sharply disavowed Simonyans remarks.11

The launch of full-scale military operations analogous to the Russian combined arms offensives of summer 2014/winter 2015 is less unlikely but still implausible. The scenario runs afoul of three obstacles. First, as noted by the Ukrainian expert, Mikhail Zhirokhov, the invading forces would need to traverse an urbanised zone or natural obstacles that provide only two or three points at which forces could be introduced. Moreover, the encroaching muddy season [rasputitsa] is inhospitable to large-scale operations. Second, such an operation requires hundreds of tanks and a large tail of diesel tankers, difficult to conceal. Photo-reconnaissance of columns of forces heading from Rostov to Ukraine are consistent with localised operations, but not deep penetrations across the demarcation line. Third, as noted by Mikhail Samus, for all its shortcomings, Ukraines army is not the army of 2015, and it would offer proper resistance.

A localised escalation, dramatic and devastating, leading to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers on the current demarcation line, is probably the most realistic option. In the view of Sergiy Garmash, its aim would be to create a new reality and reformat dynamics in the region. It would have the merit of preserving existing territorial arrangements, at least outwardly, yet it would allow for the revival of military operations at any moment required by Moscow.12Moreover, it is the one military option that fits observable evidence: the movement of forces from Russia and the mobilisation of local reserves.

Nevertheless, it requires a convincing pretext, in other words a Ukrainian attack (if only the retaliation that Kravchuk has called for since 4 March). The likely purpose of todays creeping escalation is to engineer just such a provocation. In 2017, a Russian general (GRU, retd) warned the author that Russia might deploy peacekeepers if Ukraine did not meet its obligations. Then the option was judged to be impractical. Today, options are perceived differently.

Defence Minister Sergey Shoygus recent weekend in the taiga with Putin suggests that such an operation might be weeks away or less. What we can assume with confidence is that he did not travel there to discuss meteorites, drink beer and walk in the forest, as Russian media have reported.13

That a major escalation might rally Ukraine and revitalise Western support for it is eminently possible. But that does not diminish its probability. One looks in vain for signs that experience has refuted the orthodoxy that compelling [Ukraine] by force into brotherly relations is the only method historically shown to be effective.14It is also possible that these rumours of war will dissipate as others have in the past. But if not, no one should be surprised.

Views expressed in ICDS publications are those of the author(s).

1Whilst France and Germany did not sign the accords, President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel negotiated them together with President Poroshenko and President Putin. The representatives of the so-called Donbas republics were not present during the negotiations and played no part in them.

2For the views of Ukrainian experts: Complete ceasefire in Donbas, or problems in detail, Ukrinform, 23 July 2020, http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3069095-povne-pri;

3US Dept of the Treasury, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages; Government of Canada, Sanctions List, http://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/03/sanctions-li

4NSDC hits sanctions on Putins ally Medvedchuk, UNIAN 19 February 2021, http://www.unian.info/politics/medvedchuk-nsdc-sanctions-

5Peskov commented on Kyivs introduction of sanctions against Medvedchuk [Peskov prokommentiroval vvedennye Kievom sanktsii protif Medvedchuka], gazeta.ru, 20 February 2021, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2021/02/20/n_15645092.

6Donbas: new war or local operation? What is behind the flare-up in eastern Ukraine? [Donbass: novaya voyna ili localnaya operatsiya? S chem svyazano obostrenie na vostoke Ukrainiy?] BBC Russian Service, 11 March 2021, http://www.bbc.com/russian/features-56365032

7Igor Shatrov, Donbass: Lavrov threatens to tear Macron and Merkel out of their hiding place [Donbass: Lavrov prigrozil dostat Makrona i Merkel ] Svobodnaya Pressa, 20 January 2021, svpressa.ru/politic/article/287551/

8Head of RT Simonyan in Donetsk: Mother Russia, take Donbas home [Glava RT Simonyan in Donetsk: Rossiya-matushka, zaberi Donbass domoy], Radio Svoboda, 28 January 2021, http://www.svoboda.org/a/31074432.html

9 TCG spokesman discloses death toll in Ukraine Army in Donbas since latest truce, UNIAN, 27 March,www.unian.info/war/donbas-tcg-spokesman-discloses-

10BBC, op.cit.

11Peskov commented on Simonyans words concerning the inclusion of Donbas into Russia [Peskov prokommentiroval slova Simonyan o vkliuchenii Donbassa v sostav Rossii], gazeta.ru, 29 January 2021, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2021/01/29/n_15551876.

12Sergiy Garmash, article in Mirror of the Week [Dzerkalo Tyzhnya/Zerkalo Nedeli].

13 In the taiga: Vladimir Putin and Sergey Shoygu spent a weekend in Siberia [V tayge: Vladimir Putin i Sergey Shoygu proveli vykhodniye v Sibiri], 21 March 2021, rg.ru/2021/03/21/vladimir-putin-i-sergej-shojgu-pr

14Vladislav Surkov, Surkov: I am interested in acting against reality [Surkov: mne interesno deystvovat protiv realnosti], Aktualnye Kommentarii, February 26, 2020, actualcomment.ru/surkov-mne-interesno-deystvovat-p.

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Rumours of War: Another Russian Surprise in Ukraine? - RKK ICDS